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Ever since I came across the concepts such as ethnie, nation, ethnicity and nationalism, the 
effort to master their meaning and to use them for any kind of academic purpose has not been 
an easy task. This is true because the concepts have ambiguous meanings which in turn lead 
to the production of various kinds of empirical generalizations and theoretical abstractions 
within the fields of ethnicity, ethnic conflicts, nation and nationalism.  
 
Given the fact that these concepts are highly volatile in their politicized context, it can be 
claimed that almost any one from all walks of life is interested in one way or the other to use 
these concepts. It follows then, one may claim also that both practitioners and intellectuals in 
the social sciences and humanities participate not only by using the concepts but also by 
formulating definitions from a common sense perspectives. For these reasons, these concepts 
are one of those most widely used concepts and terms in the everyday life though there is 
hardly any consensus even among the scholars in the field of study how to understand or to 
use these concepts.   
 
It has been a daunting task to encounter these two kinds of traditions that circumscribe these 
concepts, namely a tradition from the common sense perspectives and the other from the 
established traditions in the studies of ethnicity, nation and nationalism. I have had a number 
of productive debates with colleagues and alike for the past few years. Though it was a 
challenge by itself trying to address these two gaps, the discussion and debates were very 
productive as they have enabled me to see the concepts from different perspectives. 
 
The most pressing difficulty that I encountered during the period of the current MA project 
was finding a valid and strong epistemological foundation for this study. Even if the main 
research questions for the present thesis has been the same since the proposal phase, the MA 
project hardly had a stable, well established and justifiable methodology until later this year 
when I came across to the present epistemological ground that will be the focus of chapter 





Given that the time was running fast towards the deadline during the winter of 2012, the 
timing was not safe to make such big decision for the MA project by then. Yet, the 
methodological shift was a worthy risk to make for the new epistemological position 
rendered real boost for the entire project to leap forward towards achieving the goal of the 
project. This is mainly because it has given an impetus for the MA project which otherwise 
had been in a stand still for the project was locked in a kind of methodological impasse. 
Thanks to the methodological inspirations from Gadamer and Koselleck, the thesis has 
transformed into a productive research endeavor that the different parts of the thesis ranging 
from the research questions to the final concluding statements are harmonized through a kind 
of dialectical interplay among each other.             
Owing to such challenges which have been mentioned so far and some others which are 
deliberately excluded for time and space considerations, I had often passed through times of 
difficulties during which I lost confidence in myself and in everything that I was doing. From 
this context, I consider the current state of my project as a success by itself. In this regard, 
therefore, I would like to express my gratitude towards Almighty God. I am deeply thankful 
to Almighty God for his gracious love. Throughout all those difficult times that I have 
encountered so far, God has given me his love and support which are the source of my 
stamina and strength in order to accomplish many things in life including this thesis! 
The success of this thesis also rests on the support and encouragement of many individuals 
and institutions. I would like to express my gratitude towards my two supervisors. I am 
highly indebted to Professor Lud’a Klusakova, Charles University, for her kindness and 
thoughtfulness, for her proper academic guidance, for her constructive feedbacks throughout 
my engagement with the present thesis. It has also been a privilege to work with Ádám 
Takács, Assistance Professor at Atelier, Eötvös Loránd University. This thesis has gained 
enormously from his critical insights, his methodological seminars and his overall 
constructive feedbacks.    
I also like to acknowledge my debt to Gábor Czoch, Associate Professor at Atelier, Eötvös 
Loránd University, for reading parts of my drafts and giving me insightful comments. I have 
also enormously benefited from attending his classes which inspired me to read some basic 
methodological texts for my present thesis. I am also thankful to Jaroslav Ira, PhD candidate 




were helpful to improve my drafts. I also like to thank Gabriel Rockhill, Assistance Professor 
at Villanova University, for reading my methodological chapter and giving me insightful 
comments. Nevertheless, if one finds any kinds of limitations or weakness inside the current 
thesis, it has to be noted that I am solely accountable and responsible in such cases.  
During graduate school life in Europe, I have received support and encouragement from 
several professors, TEMA administrative staffs and fellow TEMA students and friends. I am 
highly indebted to all of them. My special thanks go to Alemyehu Kumsa, Charles 
University, for his kindness to use his personal belongings for my project and for his 
encouragements and advices. I am also highly indebted to Peter Erdősi, Eötvös Loránd 
University, for his support, encouragements and insightful comments. 
I am highly grateful towards Jozsef Litkei who has painstakingly edited my drafts. My 
special thanks also extend to the current TEMA Secretariat Eszter György for her kindness 
and supports. I am deeply grateful for all those professors and students I came across in both 
Praha and Budapest. My special thanks go to my Hungarian friend Daniel Verse and my 
Costa Rican friend Javier Azofeifa. I am also grateful towards two of my TEMA friends, Paul 
and Luis, for editing my French Abstract, résumé.    
I am highly indebted to my families and friends both within and outside Ethiopia for their 
love and support. My special thanks go to Shawn Schwartz for her unreserved love, support, 
care and encouragement ever since my high school times. I am also highly indebted to 
Ahmed Seid, Ermiyas Girma, Atitegeb Meazah, Meseret Tefeta, Tesfaye Ababu, Daniel 
Mesert, Semira Ali, Mohhamed Siraj and Tewodros Belayneh and his entire family. I am so 
lucky to have their love, support and care throughout my academic career.  
I would like to extend my thanks to some key institutions that have made my study in Europe 
productive, comfortable and enjoyable. First and foremost, I am highly indebted to European 
Commission’s Erasmus Mundus Program which has given me this wonderful opportunity to 
study in Europe by sponsoring my study and other costs.  I am also thankful to the library and 
manuscript sections of Institute of Ethiopian Studies in Addis Ababa, the National Library in 
Prague, and the library of Central European University in Budapest which turned to be my 




As far as the structure of the thesis is considered, I will briefly introduce the organizational 
framework of the whole thesis. The thesis has four chapters and a final concluding section. 
The main task of chapter one is twofold: One, to provide a brief overview into some 
historiographical debates upon some basic issues of Ethiopian historiography with particular 
emphasis to Oromo historiography; second, to provide some highlights concerning the basic 
issues that are subject of argument among various scholars of nation and nationalism from 
macroscopic perspective.  
 
Chapter two is entirely devoted for a task that provides a thorough methodological discussion 
in relation to the basic research questions that the current thesis aspires to answer. Since the 
central argument of the present thesis is related with the issue of validity against a dominant 
school of thought in the study of nation and nationalism, it is indispensable to ground the 
whole thesis in a strong epistemological foundation. Therefore, chapter two can be 
considered as the corner stone of the whole thesis.   
 
In chapter three, the Oromo socio-historical specificity during the 16
th
 century will be 
presented by using two modes of exposition. The first kind is descriptive in nature in which 
socio-cultural and political specificities of the Oromo polity during the same period will be 
presented from a historical and ethnographic perspectives though it will only be a brief 
overview. By using the descriptive part as a point of departure, there will also be thorough 
interpretation of different aspects of Oromo polity during the 16
th
 century in a way the 
discussion will be in harmony with the basic research questions that the thesis aspires to 
address. 
Finally, there will also be some attempt to understand the concept of nation as developed by 
European discursive traditions. This will be the focus of chapter four. In harmony with the 
chapters that have been mentioned, the thesis will conclude in its final section. Although the 
current research endeavor can be considered as a miniature within the vast tradition in the 
study of nation and nationalism, its scholarly outcome will hopefully have a contribution both 






A lot has been written on the subject matters of nation and nationalism for at least the last two 
centuries. Yet, there is hardly any single, universally accepted, overarching theory in the field 
that can facilitate common understanding among scholars who are working on the two 
concepts. It is evident that the theories of nation and nationalism need to be tested against the 
back drop of the richness of empirical realities across time and space.  
 
Yet, the task of understanding nation and nationalism has always been a daunting task mainly 
because the empirical reality by far exceeds the historical knowledge that has been recorded 
in the chronicles of world history. Provided that only a small slice of human history has been 
recorded so far, our knowledge of world history remains insignificant and incomplete, highly 
constrained by the horizon of human experience, which is inherently finite and limited. 
    
As part of the recurrent attempt from different scholars and students of nation and 
nationalism who seek to understand these two phenomena in different contexts across time, 
the current thesis also aspires to understand the concept of a nation by using the same 
tradition that is inherently part of European discursive unit, but from a different vantage 
point. Departing from historical specificity related to the Oromo polity during the 16
th
 
century, the present thesis aspires to infuse fresh interpretation to the existing European 
tradition about a nation.  
 
Therefore, the thesis seeks to answer the following two basic questions: First, to what extent 
does the modernist view that embeds the origin of a nation in the European historical context 
is valid? Second, to what extent does the existing normative knowledge base concerning the 
phenomena of a nation and an ethnic entity adequately delineate the conceptual and empirical 
boundary in between of these two phenomena. 
 
In order to address these two questions, the thesis will attempt to accomplish the following 
two basic tasks: First, the thesis will attempt to challenge the modernist universal claim, 




nation by trying to understand the phenomenon of the nation from a different temporal and 
spatial context, one that is based on the case of the Oromo during the 16
th
 century.  
 
To accomplish such ambitious endeavor, the thesis will attempt to deconstruct the concept of 
a tribe as representation of phenomenon peculiar to ‘uncivilized societies’ of Africa and 
elsewhere. In parallel, the thesis will attempt to understand the concept of an ethnic entity in 
comparison with a nation. Secondly, the thesis will attempt to understand the European fore-
tradition in relation to a nation, especially as it perceives the pre-modern period, as a means 
to grasp the social and historical context that underlies the modernists’ understanding of 
nationhood. 
 
The central focus of this thesis is; therefore, to expose a basic internal contradiction that is 
inherent in the existing conceptual understanding of a nation. Using the Oromo case as a 
vantage point, it is the conviction of this thesis that the concept of a nation is ‘Eurocentric’ to 
the neglect of historical specificities outside Europe such as the case with the Oromo people. 
Having such conviction against the validity of the modernist universal axioms, however, 
imposes a methodological requisite upon the present thesis to be grounded on a strong 
epistemological foundation. Thus the thesis will rely on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
Philosophical Hermeneutics as its epistemological foundation. Since the thesis will depart 
from the presumption that considers a nation as a concept, the thesis will attempt to capitalize 
on some methodological and conceptual insights from Reinhhart Koselleck’s History of 
Concept.  
 
The thesis will use two kinds of source materials. In order to understand a nation from the 
vantage point of the Oromo polity during the 16
th
 century, the thesis will rely on some 
primary and a number of secondary sources. The sources include historical written sources 
that have been produced between the 16
th
 century and 21
st
 century. As supplement, some 
ethnographic materials concerning the Oromo that have been collected by various authors 
after 19
th
 century will also be used. On the contrary, the thesis will also rely on a body of 
European literature on nation and nationalism that have been produced since the latter half of 
the 19
th
 century.  




Finally, the thesis will concluded its overall endeavor by making some suggestions. First, the 
concept of tribe is not methodologically appropriate to be used as a conceptual apparatus to 
represent the social and political organization of the Oromo during the 16
th
 century. Second, 
the concepts of a nation and an ethnic entity in their ideal form overlap to a greater extent that 
it is hardly possible to clearly delineate the conceptual and empirical boundary between the 
two concepts when seen from the vantage point of the Oromo specificity during the 16
th
 
century. Last, the modernist view that claims nation as the mere logical outcome of the 





Beaucoup a été écrit au sujet de la nation et du nationalisme, au moins depuis les deux 
derniers siècles. Pourtant, il n'y a guère de théorie universellement acceptée en ce domaine, 
qui puisse constituer un terrain d’entente entre les différents chercheurs travaillant sur ces 
deux concepts. Il est évident que les théories de la nation et du nationalisme doivent être 
testées à partir de la riche toile de fond des réalités empiriques, au travers du temps et de 
l'espace. Pourtant, la tâche de comprendre la nation et le nationalisme a toujours été une tâche 
ardue du fait que la réalité empirique dépasse de loin la base des connaissances enregistrées 
dans les chroniques de l'histoire du monde. Ne permettant ainsi qu’à une infime partie de 
l'histoire humaine d’être écrite, notre connaissance de l'histoire du monde est partielle voir 
insignifiante. Notre connaissance est fortement contrainte par l'horizon de l'expérience 
humaine qui est par nature finie et limitée. 
Tout comme dans les tentatives récurrentes de différents chercheurs et étudiants intéressés à 
comprendre nation et nationalisme dans différents contextes à travers le temps, la thèse 
actuelle aspire également à comprendre le concept de nation en utilisant la même tradition 
inhérente à la discursivité européenne, mais depuis une perspective différent. En s’appuyant 
sur l'histoire du peuple Oromo au cours du 16ème siècle, cette thèse aspire à insuffler une 
nouvelle interprétation de la tradition européenne concernant la nation. Par conséquent, la 
thèse vise à répondre aux deux questions fondamentales suivantes : tout d'abord, dans quelle 
mesure le point de vue moderniste qui intègre l'origine d'une nation à l'historicité européenne 
est-il valide ? Enfin, dans quelle mesure la base normée des connaissances concernant les 
phénomènes de nation et  d’entité ethnique délimite-t-elle correctement la frontière 
conceptuelle et empirique entre ces deux phénomènes. 
Afin de répondre à ces deux questions, la thèse tentera d'accomplir deux tâches. 
Premièrement, la thèse tentera de contester le model moderniste universel, en particulier ses 
contraintes temporelles et spatiales en essayant de comprendre le phénomène de nation dans 
un contexte temporel et spatial différent : les Oromo au cours du XVIème siècle. Pour réaliser 
cet ambitieux projet, la thèse tentera de déconstruire le concept de tribu vue comme model 
propre aux sociétés « primitives » d'Afrique et d'ailleurs. En parallèle, la thèse va tenter de 




tentera d’analyser la tradition européenne antérieure à l’émergence du concept de nation 
comme moyen de comprendre le contexte historique et social de l’époque. En particulier la 
façon dont la période pré-moderne est analysée ; la toile de fond de la compréhension 
moderniste de la nation. 
Le point central de cette thèse est donc de résoudre la contradiction fondamentale inhérente à 
la conceptualisation existante de la nation. En utilisant la spécificité du cas Oromo comme 
angle d’analyse, la conviction de cette thèse est que le concept de nation est « eurocentré », 
cela au détriment des spécificités historiques présentes hors Europe. S’opposer de la sorte 
contre les axiomes universels modernistes impose des prérequis méthodologiques à la thèse, 
celle-ci se doit alors d’être fondée sur une solide base épistémologique. Ainsi, la thèse 
s'appuiera sur l’herméneutique philosophique de Hans-Georg Gadamer comme fondement 
épistémologique. Puisque la thèse partira de la présupposition de la nation comme concept, 
celle-ci se basera sur les réflexions conceptuelles et méthodologiques de l'Histoire du 
Concept de Reinhhart Koselleck. La thèse fera appel à deux types de sources d’analyse. En 
vue de comprendre la nation du point de vue du régime politique Oromo durant le XVIème 
siècle, la thèse s'appuiera sur quelques sources primaire mais surtout un grand nombre de 
sources secondaires. Les sources comprendront des écrits produits entre le XVIème siècle et 
le XXIème siècle, en complément desquelles, certains matériaux ethnographiques relatifs aux 
Oromo recueillis par divers auteurs après le XIXe siècle seront également utilisés. La thèse 
s'appuiera également sur un corpus de littérature européenne produite depuis la seconde 
moitié du XIXème siècle et traitant des questions de la nation et du nationalisme. 
Enfin, la thèse conclura son entreprise en émettant quelques suggestions. Tout d'abord, le 
concept de tribu n'est pas méthodologiquement approprié pour être utilisé comme appareil 
conceptuel dans la représentation de l'organisation sociale et politique de la société Oromo du 
XVIème siècle. Ensuite, les concepts de nation et d'entité ethnique à un certain niveau se 
chevauchent, il n'est guère possible d’en délimiter clairement les limites conceptuelles et 
empiriques entre les deux concepts lorsque compris du point de vue de la spécificité des 
Oromo du XVIème siècle. Enfin, le point de vue moderniste qui prétend comprendre la 
nation comme simple conséquence logique de la période moderne n'est pas valide lorsque 
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Ethiopia has been considered as a unique country throughout Africa.
1
 Though many traits are 
attributed to the uniqueness that is associated with Ethiopia, perhaps the most enduring trait 
that enabled Ethiopia to be viewed as such is the fact that it had never been under European 
colonial rule.
2
 Ethiopia is located in the Northeast part of Africa, or to be more precise, in the 
region commonly known as the Horn of Africa. As one can see from the map presented 
below, Ethiopia shares boundary with Eritrea to the North and North-east, Djibouti to the 
East, Somalia to the South and South-east, Kenya to the South, and the two Sudans in the 
West. Since Eritrea became an independent state from Ethiopia in 1991, the latter has been 
devoid of any direct access to the Red Sea.
3
   
 
 
Figure 1: Map showing the Horn of Africa. Sources: http//:google.com.et/pictures/horn of Africa 
                                                          
1
In his recent book about Ethiopia, John Markakis notes, “Native and stranger alike commonly describe 
Ethiopia as a country that is unique on the continent of Africa. The encomium of its uniqueness traces a long past that 
reaches back to classical times…” Cf. John Markakis, “Introduction,” Ethiopia: Anatomy of a Traditional Polity 
(Addis Ababa: Shama Books, 2006), 13. 
   
2
Ibid; see also Michael Glover, an Improvised War: The Abyssinian Campaign of 1940-1941(London:  Pen 
and Sword Books, 1987), 3  
  
3





Figure 2 & Figure 3: Two Maps showing language distributions in Ethiopia [in the left] and Africa [in the 
right].Source: Google.com/images/language distributions and families in Ethiopia and Africa.   
Ethiopia has been home for diverse kinds of socio-cultural groups since at least the last 




 The preamble of the current constitution that is ratified in 1994 
stipulates that the country is home for nations, nationalities and peoples. The Oromo are one 
of those nations, nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia who have established the current 
Federal Ethiopian State according to the same constitution. The Oromia Regional State, 
which is named after its inhabitants, is the largest among the constituent federations both in 
terms of population and territorial size.
5
 Afaan Oromo is the working language of the 
federation. The language, according to linguistic classifications, is a Cushitic stock of the 
                                                          
4
This issue is one of those bones of contentions characterizing the current Ethiopian historiography. Before 
the current statuesque, there was a kind of holly alliance between the architects of mainstream Ethiopian 
historiography and the Ethiopian state. The then historiography sponsored by the state established a kind of Meta 
narrative which traces the existence of the Ethiopian state as far back as three thousand years. Yet, the current state 
and proponents of counter historiographies have challenged the unitary model superimposed by the Meta narrative of 
mainstream historiography. According to proponents of counter historiographies, the Ethiopian state as an overarching 
political institution lying over the current political territory is a mere logical outcome of the political dynamism which 
happened during the late 19
th
 century. Cf. Christopher Clapham, “Rewriting Ethiopian History,” Annales d’ Ethiopie 
18, no.3 (2002), 37-45; see also Pietro Toggia, “History Writing as a State Ideological Project In Ethiopia,” African 
Identities 6, no. 4(2008),319-338.   
 
5
According to the 2007 Population census of Ethiopia, the four largest Ethnic/Nations are Oromo 34%, 
Amhara 26.9 %, Tigrie 6.1 %, and Somali 6.2 % out of the whole Ethiopia population which is about 74 million. Cf. 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Population Census Commission, Ethiopian Population Census: 2007(Addis 




larger Afro-Asiatic language family in Africa.
6
 Though the current constitution does not 
officially ascribe a nation, nationality or people status to any of the contemporary Ethiopian 
societies, there appears to be a popular consensus that considers the Oromo a nation due to 
their large size of population. 
 
Figure 4: Federations of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. According to the 1994 Ethiopian 
Constitution, there are 9 Regional States that are listed in the map. In addition, there are also two City 
Administrations that are governed by charter from which their municipal autonomy emanates. These are 
the cities of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Source:-http//:google.com.et/pictures/regional states/Ethiopia    
In addition, the current constitution neither defines nor clarifies what it means by nation or 
nationality.
7
 Yet it has to be noted here that our current endeavor has nothing to do with 
contemporary political discourse in Ethiopia. Being inspired by the theoretical and empirical 
loopholes within the modernist paradigm of nation and nationalism studies, the current thesis 
sails to the 16
th
 century in pursuits of a mere epistemological endeavor.  
 
The thesis will aspire to understand whether nation is a mere logical outcome of the modern 
period that is the historical specificity of Europe, as widely asserted by modernist scholars or 
                                                          
6
Almost all languages in Ethiopia belong to Afro-Asiatic language family which is one of the five language 
families in Africa. Afro-Asiatic family has further braches in Ethiopia. The main one are: Cushetic/Hametic, Semetic 
and Ometic. Outside these three, there are some languages in Ethiopia that are classified as Nilo-Saharan. While the 
Afaan Oromo is grouped within Cushitic sub-division of Afro-Asiatic language family, Amharic and Tigrigna belong 
to the other sub-division, the Semetic branch. See figures 2&3.  
 
7
Some critiques of the current federal arrangement blame the statuesque as a mere imposition of Stalinist 
perspective of nation and nationalism in the Ethiopian socio-cultural and political fabrics. To what extent does such 
criticism is justified is a matter of debate by itself. After disproving a number of possibilities that seems to 
characterize a nation, Stalin comes up with his own synthesis. According to Stalin, “A nation is a historically 
constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and 
psychological make-up manifested in a common culture.” Cf. Joseph Stalin, “The Nation,” in Nationalism: Oxford 
Readers, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 18-21. 




whether nation can be disentangled from the modern period and retraced into the pre-modern 
era. The thesis will not only attempt to understand a nation from a different temporal 
perspective, but also in a different spatial, that is, African context, by using the history of the 
Oromo during the 16
th
 century as a vantage point.  
 
Before proceeding further, it is important to situate the thesis within the context of its own 
fore-tradition. As the thesis uses the historical specificity of the Oromo polity during the 16
th
 
century as its empirical reservoir, it is important that any new interpretation it presents should 
be seen as the outcome of the historiographical and ethnographic tradition that concerns the 
Oromo. Moreover, given its dependence on the theories of nation and nationalism in 
understanding its subject, the thesis should also be considered as the outcome of the 
European tradition as far as the idea of the nation is considered.  
 
To put it otherwise,  by combining the European fore-tradition of the nation with the 
historical and ethnographic fore-tradition relating to the Oromo, the current thesis seeks to 
represent a new ‘fusion of horizon’ in the field(what we mean by ‘fusion of horizon’ will be 
explained in the forthcoming chapter). On the basis of such commitment, therefore, the 
current chapter will attempt to accomplish two basic objectives: to briefly introduce some 
issues concerning Ethiopian historiography in relation to the Oromo people; and to highlight 
some of the major debates in the field of nation and nationalism. 
1.1 Some issues of Ethiopian historiography with particular emphasis on the 
Oromo people: A brief overview 
There have been fierce debates concerning the origin of the Oromo.
8
 When the debates are 
analyzed, one can notice that almost all debates take the 16
th
 century as their chronological 
takeoff.
9
 One question might be raised at this point: Why is the history of the Oromo 
discussed only from the 16
th
 century on?  Given that the Oromo have only recently developed 
                                                          
8
Cf. Alessandro Triulzi, Oromo Traditions of Origin(n.p.,n.d),593-601; Charles T. Beke, “On The Origin of 
the Gallas” Reports of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (1847),3-33; Jan Hultin, The Long 
Journey: History, Descent and land among the Mecha Oromo(Uplassa: Uplassa University, 1987),1-36; Herbert S. 
Lewis, “The Origin of the Galla and Somali,” Journal of African History 2,no.1(1996), 27-46; Ulrich Braukämper, 
“Oromo Country of Origin: A Reconsideration of Hypotheses,” in 6
th
 International Conference of Ethiopian Studies at 








a written language, which is based on the adoption of Latin alphabets, before the 20
th
 century, 
there are rarely any previous accounts on their history written from an insider perspective. 
Thus the Oromo are like the other subject peoples in Southern Ethiopia who did not have a 
written culture until recent times; their past had been thus partly preserved in the 
community’s collective memory through oral traditions.
10
  
In addition, their past had partly been recorded or mentioned in the written accounts basically 
from the written culture that developed in the northern half of present day’s political map of 
Ethiopia.  Before historical writing became a profession in Ethiopia in 1960s, the two most 
important written accounts of the past for present day Ethiopia are hagiographic accounts and 
royal chronicles. Whereas the former were meant for reflecting the values of the Ethiopian 
Orthodox Christianity, the latter were written mainly as means of praising their patron kings. 
Such unwavering loyalty to their respective patron institutions resulted in a “decidedly 
political and religious bias.”
11
 Consequently, the Oromo and other subject peoples in Ethiopia 
were not only mentioned rarely but were also treated as “others.”
12
  
                                                          
10
As far as the Oromo are considered, the following discussion on Oral historiography is important in this case. 
Emergent Oromo historiographers are capitalizing on Oral traditions to negate distortions and filling in the existing 
gaps. In light of such endeavor, Tesema Ta’a argues how much Oral historiography is important for the Oromo for the 
same reasons we have disclosed in the text. Tesema cited two different passages from different authors to make his 
case. Since I found the two quoted passage very illustrative of the point I am making,  I would like to present the two 
passages here. The first one is from Jan Vansina who is renowned scholar in the fields of Oral historiography. Vansina 
states, “In those parts of the world inhabited by people without writing, oral tradition forms the main available sources 
for reconstructions of the past, and even among people who have writing, are based on oral traditions. Thus, a claim 
for the practical utility of research on the specific characteristics of oral tradition, and on the methods for examining 
its trustworthiness, is doubly substantiated.” The second passage is from Asafa Jalata who is a politician by training 
but with keen interest to Oromo historiography. Jalata confirms, “For generations, the Oromo have transmitted their 
history mainly through Oral discourse…we lack documented information [about Oromo history-mine]. The Oromo 
historiography requires a thorough and critical study of oral traditions. For the Oromo, ‘each time an old man [or a 
woman] dies a library is lost.” For both quotations, refer to Tesema Ta’a, “Oral Historiography on Oromo Studies,” in 
New Trends in Ethiopian Studies: Papers of the 12
th
 International Conference of Ethiopian Studies Presented in 
Michigan State University, ed. Harold G. Marcus and Grover Hudson (New Jersey: The Red Sea Press, 1994), 981. 
Compare also, Maurice Halbwachs, “Chapter 3: The Reconstruction of the Past,” in On Collective Memory, trans. and 
ed. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: Chicago University, 1992), 47-49.    
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To see as to why and how the Oromo were depicted as “others” in Ethiopian Written Sources, the 
following quote from Mohammed is very illustrative: “During the sixteenth and subsequent centuries much was 
written on the military conflict between the Oromo and the medieval Christian kingdom of Abyssinia. The Oromo 
were generally described simply as ‘the enemies of the Amhara’ and what was written about them by the Christian 
chroniclers mainly expressed the intense prejudice which was deeply rooted in Abyssinian society… The Ethiopian 
ruling class even succeeded in elevating its anti-Oromo prejudice to the plane of state ideology, which was uncritically 
repeated in the name of scholarship.” See Mohammed Hassen, the Oromo of Ethiopia: A History 1570-1860(New 





As a result, the history of the Oromo people has been either distorted or belittled.
13
 There are 
three possible reasons for this.  First, records about the Oromo have been written from an 
outsider perspective, and as such are likely to reflect outsiders’ values implicitly or explicitly 
imposed on the subject matter; second, the authors’ background, motives and orientations 
inevitably result in selectivity of events; and finally, the fact that the Oromo has been the 
largest entity in Ethiopia in terms of population, natural wealth and territorial extent made it 
likely that their past has been distorted to further political-economic ends
14
  
                                                          
13
It is important to see two examples as to how the Oromo and other subjected peoples were either pushed 
into the corners of Ethiopian historiography or their history has been belittled. Two quotes will be presented to 
illustrate the point that is being discussed. The first quote to be presented here is the notorious expression about the 
Oromo that is quoted almost in all historiographical reviews concerning Oromo. The one that is quoted by Hassen 
claims that “the Galla[Oromo] had nothing to contribute to the civilization of Ethiopia, they possessed no material or 
intellectual culture, and their social organization was at a far lower stage of development than of the population 
among whom they settled.”See ibid, 2. The other quote to be presented here is from Hussein Ahmed who is renowned 
scholar in the historiography of Islam inside Ethiopia. As a response to some biased scholarships towards Ethiopian 
Muslims by some authors like J. Spencer Trimingham who claims, “Islam in the region would have no history without 
Abyssinia,” Ahmed argues opposing such views as: “Such statements…are not unusual. They are part of the long-
established historiographical   prejudice which has been a common feature of most of the available works dealing with 
Islam in Ethiopia. The main basis for the views expressed regarding Islam in Ethiopia is the conventional distinction 
they and many other writers have often made between what they refer to as ‘historic Abyssinia,’ which is Semitic and 
Christian, and Ethiopia, which as a broad and political and geographical unit made up of diverse peoples, emerged 
much later. See Hussein Ahmed, “The Historiography of Islam in Ethiopia,” Journal of Islamic Studies 3, no. 1(1992), 
15-17.Though some writers used Abyssinia as synonymous to Ethiopia, it assumes a different place within the 
contours of Ethiopian historiography. According to these debates, the term Abyssinia has limited application 
connoting to the political tradition in the Northern Part of the country whereas Ethiopia connotes to the wider area and 
society under today’s political territory of the country. While some argue that the Ethiopian state is a direct continuity 
of the former Abyssinian political tradition, others argue in the opposite calming that Ethiopia super-imposed itself 
upon rather distinct entities of the North and the South using the Abyssinian state craft only after the second half of 
the 19
th
 century.               
  
14
Historical sources show that the ruling Abyssinian elite had deliberately written off the Oromo from its Meta-
narratives of the Ethiopian polity which professed three thousand aged civilizations. On the contrary, the Oromo were 
told as strangers in a form of enmass immigrants until very recently. Currently, this issue has been resolved decisively 
owing to strong historical evidences which negate such distortions. Cf. Eike Haberland, “Galla Sud-Athiopiens,” in 
summarized English Translation by Institute of Ethiopian Studies’ mimeographed copy, IES/A/68(1970),1-17.  The 
question is, what was the motivation behind manipulation of history by the hegemonic Abyssinian elites vis-à-vis the 
Oromo? In addition to some of the points mentioned in the text, the Oromo also form the heart of Ethiopia from the 
point view of their geographical location within Ethiopia. Owing to their location at the center of the country, the 
Oromo serve as a geographical bridge between every other regional communities of Ethiopia. Under the current 
federal arrangement, the Oromia Regional State shares boundary with all federations, but Tigeray Regional State that 
is located in the northern corner of Ethiopia. If the Oromo were to break up from Ethiopia as propagated by few 
Oromo nationalists, it would mean total dismemberment of the Ethiopian State. Foucauldian’s interplay of 
power/knowledge seems working behind the scene of such political strategy in manipulating historical truths by the 
hegemonic elite. Cf. Nick J. Fox, “Foucault, Foucauldians and Sociology,” The British Journal of Sociology 49, no.3 
(1998), 146. Such scenario based on Foucauoldian interplay of power and knowledge is not without base. Though the 
current thesis does not look upon the source at our disposal in this particular case as conclusive evidence, the source is 
sufficient enough to have such claim at the level of scenario. The source is based on the testimony of General Taddess 
Biru who is a renowned Oromo Nationalist figure. According to this source, the General joined Oromo nationalist 
association only after being informed unintentionally from the ruling circles concerning the ruling elite’s conspiracy 
to discourage the Oromo from being a force that could threaten the Ethiopia state before 1974. Cf. Olana Soga,  Gizit 





Currently, there is a lack in Ethiopia of a common historiographical platform to reconstruct 
and interpret the past. We have at least two main trends in this regard: Mainstream 
historiography and Counter/Alternative historiographies. The former has developed a kind of 
historical meta-narrative that traces Ethiopia’s past back to the era before the birth of 
Christianity. This historiographical school uses the continuity of the Ethiopian state between 




The alternative camps, on the contrary, consider the Ethiopian state with its present day 
territorial extent as mere logical outcome of the 19
th
 century, during which modern Ethiopian 
state has emerged by merging the otherwise autonomous political units in today’s Sothern 
and Northern portion of the country. Within this camp, we find emerging historiographies, 
namely, Eritrean historiography, Islamic historiography, Oromo historiography and so on.
16
 
The past is a shared battlefield for both the mainstream and the alternative historiographical 
camps. They also use more or less the same sources, that is, Abyssinian written accounts. The 
only difference between these two main historiographical traditions is the fact that each 
tradition treats the past differently so that we have competing interpretations of the Ethiopian 
past.        
As one of the alterative historiographical schools in Ethiopia, the emergent Oromo 
historiography aspires to throw light on Oromo’s past, that is, either neglected or distorted by 
the mainstream Ethiopian historiographical tradition. Emergent Oromo scholars devote their 
academic work to overcome these serious shortcomings concerning the historiography of 
Oromo polity.
17
 They have established the Oromo Studies Association that publishes the 
Journal of Oromo Studies (JOS) since 1993. In his editorial remark marking the first 
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The most outstanding contribution is from Mohamed Hassen who wrote his PhD dissertation on history of 
the Oromo. His current book which is mentioned elsewhere in the earlier citations was directly adopted from his 
dissertation with little modifications. His work has been revolutionary in the field of Oromo historiography for it was 
the first serious historical scholarship on the history of Oromo from an inward perspective. Negaso Gidada’s,  who 
served as a president of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia under the current regime,  published PhD 
dissertation is also worthy of mentioning. The book is entitled, “History of the Sayyo Oromo of Southwestern 
Wallaga, Ethiopia from about 1730 to 1886”. It was published in 1984 at Frankfurt. Since then, young Oromo 
scholars are mushrooming both at a doctoral and MA level whose studies are focusing on various aspects of the 
Oromo history. Tesema Ta’a is also among those emergent Oromo scholars who are making a difference in the 





publication of the Journal of Oromo Studies, Mohammed Hassen expresses his hope that “the 
knowledge base and research results of the contributors to JOS will serve as indestructible 
forces for forging a rightful place in history for the Oromo.”
18
      
One of the issues that have recently been revisited by emergent Oromo historians is the 
historical debate concerning Oromo’s presence in today’s Ethiopian territory. These Oromo 
historians are exerting great effort to go beyond the 16
th
 century into a deeper past. They are 
using fresh interpretations of existing historical sources that basically consist of Abyssinian 
royal chronicles and hagiographic sources.
19
 To date, nevertheless, the most widely cited 
written record about the Oromo is the one written by an Abyssinian priest, Abba Bahrey. 
Abba Bahrey, who is believed to have lived during the 16
th
 century, wrote the first detailed 
account about the Oromo.  
Most debates concerning the origin of Oromo revolve around the interpretation and 
reinterpretation of this source. Given that the Abyssinians and the Oromo were fighting each 
other at the time, one should not be surprised that the Oromo were presented by Abba Bahery 
in a way that reflected an enemy’s perspective. As a matter of fact, Abba Bahrey opened his 
record as follows: “I (hereby) begin to… (write about) the Galla
20
 in order that I may know 
the number of their tribes, their zeal to kill people, and the brutality of their (manners).”
21
 
Therefore, Oromo’s past have hardly been represented in the meta-narratives of Ethiopian 
historiography.  Given such peripheral status in Ethiopian historiography itself, it is thus 
hardly surprising that the Oromo and other similar societies of Ethiopia received little 
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Hassen, ed. “Editorial,” Journal of Oromo Studies 1, no. 1 (1993) 
 
19
Using exiting hagiographic and royal sources dating as back to the 14
th
 century, some prominent Oromo 
scholars including some Oromo technocrats in the current regime, claim that there are evidence that throw light on the 
presence of Oromo in today’s central Ethiopia during the 14
th
 century. Cf. Hassen, “The Pre-Sixteenth-Century 
Oromo Presence within the Medieval Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia,” in a River of Blessings: Essays in Honor of 
Paul Baxter, ed., David Brokensha (Syracuse: Syracuse University, 1994), 43-61.  
       
20
Galla is a name used to refer to the Oromo in the past though the Oromo never used the term to call 
themselves. Today, it is derogatory term that no one uses it since it has been considered as an element of civil offence 
under the framework of the current regime’s legal statuesque.  
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Charles F. Beckingham, trans., “Ethnography of the Galla , by Abba Bahiry,” in Abba Bahery’s Essay’s: 
Other Documents Concerning the Oromo, ed. Getachew Haile(Minnesota: Avon, 2002), 195. The original manuscript 
was written in Gee’ez, a language which is no longer has a significant speaker in Ethiopia but a liturgical language in 
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. This book is of great resource for the current project. It has both an English and 
Amharic translation to the only primary source concerning the Oromo during the 16
th
 century. Owing to the fact that I 
am not literate in Gee’ez, the availability of those primary documents in Amharic and English translation is 





attention in the annals of world history. This is clearly evident in Kjetil Tronvoll’s 
assessment. “For centuries,” he argues, “‘Ethiopia’ has been equated with the ancient 
Abyssinian cultures of Amhara and Tigeray, in both governmental presentation and foreign 
understanding. The range of other ethnic groups in Ethiopia has scarcely been visible, and 
until recently little interest has been shown towards understanding their cultures and 
traditions.”
22
   
2.1 Introducing theories of nation and nationalism with much emphasis on 
the modernists’ view: A macroscopic observation 
The twin phenomena of nations and nationalism have shaped the world we know today and 
yet they have consistently confounded attempts at systematic analysis. Myriad scarps of proof 
have been collated and a wide range of different explanatory theories (often contradictory) 
have been advanced, in attempts to pin down these elusive concepts. Often, definitive answers 
have seemed within reach, only to fade from view with the arrival of fresh evidence or the 
advent of newer, seemingly more sophisticated, theories.
23
   
The above excerpt is taken from Paul Lawrence’s opening paragraph for his book that treats 
the history of nationalism and its various theories. As he aptly puts it, the twin concepts, 
nation and nationalism, have always been problematic and thus their conceptual dimension 
remains as dynamic as it has always been the case. For instance, Tom Nairn, who is a 
distinguished Marxist scholar of nationalism, highlights the difficulty of the phenomenon in 
the following way: 
‘[N]ationalism’[sic.] in its  most general sense is determined by certain features of the World 
political economy, in the era between the French and Industrial Revolutions and the present 
day. We are still living in this era. However, we enjoy the modest advantage of having lived 
in it longer than the earlier theorists who wrestled with the problem. From our present 
vantage-point, we may be a little more able than they were to discern some overall 
characteristics of the process and its by-products. Indeed it would not say much for us if we 
were not able to do this.
24
 
                                                          
22
See, Kjetil Tronvoll, “Minority Rights: Reports,” in MRG1, no. 1, IES Archives/ 3115(n.d.), 5. 
 
23
Paul Lawrence, Nationalism: History and Theory (Harlow: Pearson and Longman, 2005), 1.  
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See Tom Nairn, “The Maladies of Development,” in Nationalism: Oxford Readers, ed. John Hutchinson 




In another occasion, Nairn has craftily showed the inherent internal contradiction 
within the theory of nationalism. According to Nairn:  
 
The task of a theory of nationalism-as a distinct from a stratagem for living with contradiction 
- must be to embrace both horns of the dilemma. It must be to see the phenomenon as a 
whole, in a way that rises above those ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ sides. Only in this fashion can 
we hope to escape from a predominantly moralizing perspective upon it , and rise …[sic] I 
will not say to a ‘scientific’ one, as this term has been subjected to so much ideological abuse, 
but at least to better, more detached historical view of it. In order to do this, it is necessary to 
locate the phenomenon in a larger explanatory framework one that will make sense of the 
contradictions. The question arises of what this framework is. My belief is that the only 




It can be argued that nation and nationalism belong to the highly contested terrains in social 
sciences and humanities.
26
 Owing to their conceptual fluidity, a lot has been suggested 
concerning their origin, nature, essence and so on. We can observe this difficulty with one of 
such suggestions if we note the following argument by Craig Calhoun. According to 
Calhoun, “nationalism is too diverse to allow a single theory to explain it all.”
27
 In his view, 
“much of the contents and specific orientation of various nationalisms is determined by 
historically distinct cultural traditions, the creative actions of leaders, and contingent 
situations within the international world order.”
28
  
Anthony Smith also remarks that “the history of nationalism is as much a history of its 
interlocutors as of the ideology and the movement itself.”
29
 Smith thus highlights that what 
we know about the phenomenon that is referred as nationalism could also be in part the 
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I have made the emphasis to the last sentence of Nairn for two reasons: one, partly because I share his 
conviction that world history as a whole has to be used as the only real sources of authority for theories of nation and 
nationalism, two, partly because Nairn’s conviction will render a methodological leverage for more or less similar 
suggestions that my thesis will make at different stages of the forthcoming chapters. To have an original view from 
Nairn, cf.Narin, The Break-up of Britain,” in Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, ed. John Hutchinson 
and Anthony D. Smith, vol.1, (London: Routledge, 2000), 290.            
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Christophe Jaffrelot, “Types and Theories: For a Theory of Nationalism,” in Revisiting Nationalism: 




As quoted in Jafferlot, “Types and Theories,” 10-11. 
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 Ibid, 10. 
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 Anthony Smith, “Nationalism and Historians,” in Mapping the Nation, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London: 




outcome of intellectual construction. In light of this point, Smith argues that “exactly because 
it appears so protean and seems so elusive, nationalism reveals itself only in its various 
forms, or rather the forms given to us by its proponents and critics.”
30
  
Though a lot seems to have been produced so far concerning these issues, achieving any kind 
of comprehensive or overarching theory that could resolve existing controversies remains 
questionable.
31
 Despite a number of journals and readers on nation and nationalism have been 
published, Christophe Jeffrlelot still believes that the twin concepts continue to present a 
puzzle for the social sciences. Though nation and nationalism remain enigmatic, Jaffrlelot 
rejects any skepticism infused into the field by the likes of Calhoun and John Hall. John Hall 
argues for example that “no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible. As the 
historical record is diverse, so too must be our concepts.”
32
 In response to such skepticism 
towards a universal theory of nationalism, Jeffrlelot reacts with the following argument: 
“What is at stake here is the very mission of social sciences, which are supposed to use, or 
build, concepts applicable to different contexts and situations. It is certainly high time to react 
against such aggressive tendencies which would take us back to pre-analytical, typology-
oriented forms of social sciences.”
33
  
The debate that has been shown awhile ago is one instance among numerous other kinds of 
theoretical and historical debates in the field of nation and nationalism. If we dare to present 
such diverse views and counter opinions in the field, there will not be an end to such a task. 
For the sake of space and scope constraint, thus it is better to classify or categorize those 
different arguments and counter arguments into some kind of analytical typology that can be 
helpful to introduce the conceptual terrain of nation and nationalism.  





The issue seems gaining attention across disciplines and some journals and readers are being devoted to the 
study of nation and nationalism. Jaffrelot lists a number of readers and journals that have been produced in the field of 
study as follows: “Nation and Nationalism (Cambridge University Press and then Blackwell. Oxford)was born in 
1995 and National Identity(Macmillian) in 1999; …The Nationalism Reader(New Jersey, 1995) edited by Omar 
Dahbour and Micheline Ishay, Nationalism(Oxford, 2000)edited by John Hutchison and Anthony Smith, Becoming 
National: A Reader(Oxford, 1996), edited by Geoff Eley and Girgor Suny...Encyclopaedia of Nationalism(Oxford, 











Even though one may find also other works that have made taxonomy of different theories of 
nation and nationalism, the current chapter departs from Anthony Smith’s meta-theoretical 
work Nationalism and Modernism to give a brief theoretical overview of nation and 
nationalism.
34
 On the basis of Smith’s meta-theory, thus we can classify the works that have 
been produced in relation to nation and nationalism into three main broad schools of thought. 
These are the dominant views of the Modernists camp
35
; the alternative views of the 
Perennialists /Primordial thinking; and the third alternative, the Ethno-symbolic approach.
36
 
Modernist Paradigm: The theoretical crux of this paradigm is twofold: One, nationalism is 
the product of the modern period, which is historically understood as a period that has come 
into being in Europe after the second half of the eighteenth century.
37
 Second, nations are 
mere creations of nationalism, which is understood either as a political movement or as a 
doctrine.
38
 When introducing the modernist paradigm in their book, Atsuko Ichijo and 
Gordana Uzelac note that “in order to provide a brief overview of the modernist theories, it 
will be necessary to concentrate on themes that these theories have in common, rather than to 




According to them, modernists can be roughly dived into two sub-divisions: “on the one 
hand, those who see the period of transition to modernity as a set of processes that led 
                                                          
34
Though it may help to lean into Smith’s reputation owing to his unsurpassed contribution to the field of 
study as justification for my choice, Smith’s influence in my way of thinking and understanding of nation and 
nationalism is, however, the real reason why I have chosen his meta-theoretical work among few others. 
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It is important to note here that “Literature on nations and nationalism tends to label modernism as the 
most dominant approach to the study of these phenomena [nation and nationalism],” as Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana 
Uzelac’s argue, “The dominance is explained not only by the sheer number theories who call themselves modernists, 
but also by the apparent explanatory potency of these theories.” See Atsuko Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac, eds., 
“Modernism: Introduction,” When is the Nation? Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism(London: 
Routledge, 2005), 9         
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Yet, it has to be noted that the boundaries among each of these schools are not neat and clean. Since 
the schools are a mere conventional schematization of the diverse views and arguments in the field of nation and 
nationalism,    
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Such conception is based on three pillars of the modern period: Industrial revolution; the French 
Revolution; and the Enlightenment movements. As far as nation and nationalism are considered, the first two are 
taken as a foundation when modernist argues that nationalism is the product of the modern period.   
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towards the system integration and, on the other, those that emphasize processes of socio-
cultural integration.” In the former sub-category, the work of Ernest Gellner’s Nation and 
Nationalism is mentioned as the most prolific contribution.
40
 For Gellner, nation as a unified 
socio-cultural entity having its own state is only conceivable during the modern era. He 
argues that the objective conditions during the pre-modern world were in no way conducive 
to facilitate or support either the formation or the existence of the phenomenon referred as a 
nation. To further highlight Gellner’s view concerning the last point, let’s us borrow some 
lines from Gellner himself and state his central argument here. According to him, “the great, 
but valid, paradox is this: nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, 




In the same category, there are others who emphasize military and administrative expansions 
and the centralization of the state as key to the transition to the modern society vis-à-vis 
Gellner’s material precondition. John Breuilly is one of those prominent scholars that give 
primacy to the modernization of the state craft as key for the reconstruction of the society in a 
new model. For Breuilly, there are three pillars on which all nationalist arguments are 
founded. According to him, these pillars are the following: “(1) There exists a nation with an 
explicit and peculiar character. (2) The interests and values of the nation take priority over all 
other interests and values. (3) The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually 




Those who view “nation and nationalism as a vehicle for the processes of socio-cultural 
integration of modern societies,” include such prominent scholars as Eric Hobsbawm and 
Benedict Anderson. Such socio-cultural integration occurs either at the level of ideas or 
“through the means of communications,” so that some kind of ‘national consciousness’ can 
be forged along horizontal and vertical planes. According to Hobsbawm, nations are part and 
parcel of the invented traditions of nationalist projects.
43
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On the other hand, Anderson through his widely acclaimed publication, Imagined 
Communities, rebuffs the real existence of a nation. Using print capitalism as its main 
methodological foundation, Anderson claims that nation is the result of imagination of the 
literate section of the modern society. If we have to consider nation as a community that is 
tied up with reciprocal nature of sentimental bond, then such reciprocal bond can only be 




As far as the taxonomy we are using now is considered, Hobsbawm’s and Anderson’s works 
fall entirely into the modernist schema. Yet, the moment other kinds of normative typology 
are taken into consideration, as for instance one that differentiates between modernism and 
post-modernism, then these two works would rather fall into the second kind of typology.
45
    
 
All modernist theories hold either overtly or covertly that the two phenomena, that is, nation 
and nationalism are highly embedded in European historical context. Their presence outside 
Europe is partly considered the outcome of diffusion of ideas in which nation and nationalism 
representing a part within the larger package of modernity. According to the diffusion model, 
the whole colonial apparatus; colonial state, colonial officials, elites of the colonial subjects 
have played their own role by facilitating these two twin phenomena to diffuse from Europe 
to Africa and elsewhere, either through the process of transplantation or imitation.  
 
As far as Africa is considered in such diffusion model, John Hutchison and Anthony D. 
Smith note that “the inauthenticity of nation-state models to African circumstances has long 
been a matter for debate, with scholars decrying European empires for creating state 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
original context, see Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Tradition,” in The Invention of Tradition, ed. Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).  
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To further elucidate Andersons view, some lines have been taken from his book and presented here. 
Anderson posits, “If the development of print-as-commodity is the key to the generation of wholly new ideas of 
simultaneity, still, we are simply at the point where communities of the type ‘horizontal-secular, transverse-time’ 
become possible. Why, within that type, did the nation become so popular? The factors involved are obviously 
complex and various cases can be made for the primacy of capitalism.” Cf. Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1991), 37.   
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In relation to the point that is discussed in the text, the following remark from Smith is important. For 
Smith, “post-modern constructivists, reacting against the essentialism and naturalism of nationalism and 
‘primordialism’, see the nation as ultimately a fiction engineered by elites using ‘invented traditions’ for purposes of 
social control, as Hobsbawm and Ranger had claimed, or, taking their cue from Anderson, as a novel form of 
‘imagined community’, a discursive formation of linguistic and symbolic practice.” See Smith, Ethno-Symbolism and 





territorial boundaries inappropriate to the character of the indigenous populations or for 




Taking into consideration such kinds of modernists’ views, various theories under the 
umbrella of modernist paradigm are given different labels by their critics. These labels 
include “structuralist, functionalist, constructionist and instrumentalist.”
47
 Given that the 
temporal and spatial locus for the origin of nation and nationalism are located in European 
specificities, the whole modernist school is blamed for its ‘Eurocentric’ orientation by its 
critics. For example, the following quote from Ichijo and Gordana Uzelac is illustrative of the 
point that has been established awhile ago:   
…it is important to note that unlike primordialists and ethno-symbolists, modernist theories 
are unavoidably Eurocentric. It was Europe, after all, that experienced changes as its political, 
economic and social, levels around the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, changes so dramatic that they deserve a label as the beginning of the new 
era. Theories that offer some explanation of the rise of nations and nationalism in non-
European societies…are mainly engaged in applying the developed European model to those 
communities. Here, the explanation of the emergence of phenomenon such as the nation is 
firmly grounded in one specific geo-political area in specific historical period marked with an 
equally specific set of social processes known as modernity.
48
       
 
In a nutshell, the basic modernists’s assumptions concerning a nation can be summed up as 
follows: First, nations are considered as a real sociological entities; second, “they are 
composed of discrete populations, a given territory, a distinct set of institutions and roles, and 
parallel, but unique cultures”
49





Perennial/Primordial Paradigm: On the basis of the primordial school of thought, some 
critiques have been aired against the modernists’ arguments. But before primordialism has 
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drawn lately into the debates of nation and nationalism from the fields of Ethnicity, some of 
primordialists’ assumptions were already the organizing principles of nationalists’ arguments. 
Thus one may claim that modernism initially emerged as a critique against nationalists’ 
ideologies. Smith for instance argues that “The oldest paradigm of nations and nationalism, 
the one against modernism has always battled, is the nationalist. Or rather, one version of the 




Primordialism as school of thought were not originally part of the debates concerning nation 
and nationalism though part of their thinking were at the bedrock of nationalists’ arguments 
as indicated earlier. The primordial school has been drawn into the field of nation and 
nationalism from the field of study that focuses on ethnicity.
52
 Addressing the issue from a 
socio-biological perspective, proponents of the primordial school stress the importance of 
genetic relatedness and biological givens, claiming that both ethnic entities and nations are 




Contrary to such biological essentialism, there are others who focus on the cultural given as a 
central unifying structure for such social realities as ethnic entities and nations. According to 
these latter groups of exponent of primordial elements, an individual—by the nature of being 
born to a certain community—develops a bond of attachment with that community. A nation 
could be defined accordingly as a community of common culture wherein members are tied 
up with a reciprocal bond, which is necessarily involuntary. In addition, since such primordial 
ties and bonds are sometimes considered as something sacred, individual choices and 




On the other hand, the perennial school high lights “the historical antiquity of the type of 
social and political organization known as the ‘nation’, its immemorial or perennial 
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 Even if proponents of the perennial school consider nations as historical and 
social phenomena, they reject natural essentialism, as claimed by their counterparts following 
the primordial thinking. Although perennialists accept the modernists’ view concerning 
nationalism, as a movement and ideology being an outcome of the modern period, they 
“regard nations either as updated versions of immemorial ethnic communities or as collective 





Primordial thinkers are labeled as essentialists by their critics. In today’s scholarly 
atmosphere, marked by postmodernist critique and a tendency to consider everything in terms 
of either historical or social construction, the ‘essentialist creed’ has become a loaded 
expression that few are willing to be associated with. What is more, both kinds of 
constructivists’ conceptions underpin the inevitability of historical and social dynamism 
across time and space vis-à-vis any essentialist tendency in the social universe. In addition, 
the primordial schools are also criticized for their failure to give some room for individual 
agency when they consider the bonds as the result of involuntary behavior of individuals 
constrained by the perceived sacredness of these bonds.   
 
On the other hand, perennialists are criticized for their fit and knit activity using an 
abundance of historical examples from the larger canvas of world history. According to their 
critics, the arguments from the perennial school tend to assume “the form of general assertion 
accompanied by brief examples.”
57
 They are criticized for using very scanty historical 





As far as the Ethiopian case is considered, I concur with Breuily’s criticism against one 
specific work that belongs to perennialists’ tradition. In order to justify why I have taken such 
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position, I will give some space here to present Adrian Hastings’s faulty interpretation and 
hence improper usage of Ethiopian history to be found in one of his works. Among 
perennialists, perhaps the most popular figure in the field is Adrian Hasting whose fame has 
widespread after the publications of his work that is entitled as, The Construction of 
Nationhood.  
 
One of the strengths of Hasting’s work is his initiative to bring historical specificities outside 
Europe into the attentions of nation and nationalism studies. A case in point is a chapter that 
he devotes for the treatment of non-European specificities. Despite such merits, however, 
Hasting has either misinterpreted or distorted some aspects of Ethiopian history. To begin 
with, Hasting begins his presentation of the Ethiopian case by imposing his personal values 
when he states that some aspects of Ethiopian history are “in some ways unAfrican.”
59
 
Needless to mention that while such qualitative distinction is by itself highly ‘Eurocentric,’ 
this is not the main reason why Hasting work has received special emphasis here.  
 
Provided the fact that Hasting has used few sources which are not typical historical ones, as 
far as the Ethiopian case is concerned, one can easily identify some historical inaccuracies in 
his interpretations.
60
 Firstly, contrary to his claim that the Ethiopian state is one “with a 
continuous history of 1500 years,”
61
 the meta-narrative of mainstream Ethiopian 
historiography claims 3000 years of continuity, tracing its origin some centuries before the 
Christian era. Bahru Zewde, who is a prominent figure in the mainstream of Ethiopian 
historiography, as for example notes in the following manner:  
Conventionally, Ethiopian history began with the visit of the Queen of Sheba, allegedly from 
Ethiopia, to Solomon, King of Israel, in the tenth century BC: hence the reference to 
Ethiopia’s ‘three thousand years of history’ that we hear and read so often. Aside from the 
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fact that this association has scarcely any scientific basis, it represents too short a view of the 
Ethiopian past.
62
     
 
Secondly, it is difficult to justify his claim that there was some kind of ‘collective 
consciousness’ that was equally shared by the elites and the masses.
63
 One of the widely 
recognized limitations of mainstream Ethiopian historiography is the fact that it is focused on 
political narratives to the neglect of the masses and other themes. In such context, it proves a 
daunting task to establish whether or not there was some kind of consciousness at a popular 
level as Hasting attempts to show. It is evident that almost all chronicler accounts had been 
preoccupied with the glory and praise of the patron kings to the neglect of the everyday life 
of the masses. And as for the hagiographic accounts, the emphasis is on the process of 
proselytization and praise of the religious figures that played a prominent role in such 
processes.     
 
Thirdly, the application of religious variant of nationalism on a historical event that occurred 
in Ethiopia during the 17
th
 century is rather precarious than appealing. The problem is not 
why he drags the issue to the pre-modern period or to the Ethiopian context. The problem 
rests whether that specific historical event corresponds to Hastings central argument in his 
book or not. There was indeed a religious conflict between the followers of the Roman 
Catholic belief and the worshipers of the Ethiopia Orthodox Church, with the masses on both 
sides participating in the civil war. Up to this level, Hasting’s claim is thus historically 
acceptable.  
 
It, however, seems plausible that his interpretation of this particular historical case is 
problematic to some extent. Though the Portuguese were the main architect of the spread of 
the Catholic faith in the period, Emperor Susenyos and some of his dignitaries, including 
some of his brothers, were among the converts and attempted to play some role in making the 
Roman Catholic faith an official religion. On the other side, one of the king’s brothers was 
the leading figure of the resistance that ultimately led to a kind of civil war that divided kin 
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The point that needs to be addressed here is, whether we can consider such religious civil 
wars that were waged among brothers at various levels of the society as one variant of 
nationalism or not. Religion was at the center of the civil war. Yet, does it seem justified to 
claim that the type of identity that was forged along religious confessions with the consequent 
mobilization of the masses constitutes one variant of nationalism? Though there can be some 
instances in which religion is the base of identity formation and consequently serves as a 
resource to mobilize the masses in the spirit of nationalism, it is highly precarious to apply 
such line of reasoning to the 17
th
 century Ethiopian historical case.  
 
Finally, it seems very likely that Hasting has only a scant acquaintance with the richness of 
Ethiopian history. Hasting argues that “it is hard to deny that the basic characteristics of a 
nation were present in Ethiopia-though not of course, in the non-Amharic peoples who were 
conquered by it unless and until they were assimilated into its religions and linguistic 
unity.”
65
 In his view, “Becoming a Christian meant becoming Amharic.”
66
 For one thing, the 
process of conquest only occurred after 19
th
 century. Before this, Ethiopia did not yet exist 
within its present day political boundary. Rather, the territory was home for a number of 









 When Amharization had been fully implemented after 1941, the 
intention of the then Ethiopian regime was to mold a single, unitary, homogenous Ethiopian 
nation at the expense of the richness of Ethiopian diversity. When such was a case, it was not 
only those societies in the south that were structurally marginalized, but also non-Amharic 
societies in the north like the Tigerean and Eritreans.
69
              
 
Ethno-symbolism views ethnic entities and nations as part of the same continuum in which 
the persistence of ethnic relations renders a foundation for the formation of nationhood.  
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Given that ethno-symbolism, like modernism, regards nations as a modern phenomenon, the 
pre-modern period is considered as la longue durée during which ethnic phenomena are 
considered almost as ubiquitous social and historical realities.  
 
As a means of understanding the process of nation formation, ethno-symbolism gives due 
regard to the process of ethno-genesis mainly because there is a conviction from the school 
that modern nations are highly embedded in their ethnic past. Myths of common origin, 
ethno-national symbols and patterns of communications are seen, by ethno-symbolism, as 
basic symbolic patterns through which the link between modern nations and their ethnic past 
could be established. Ethno-symbolism, therefore, grounds the formation of nations to a large 




As an emergent school in the field of nation and nationalism, ethno-symbolism borrows some 
basic assumptions and theoretical ingredients from all the other schools mentioned so far. 
Like modernists, Ethno-symbolism considers nationalism as an outcome of the modern era, 
but rejects the modernists’ assertion that nations are a mere logical outcome or by-product of 
nationalism. Yet, ethno-symbolism shares with modernists when the latter considers nations 




Ethno-symbolism differs from modernists in the following basic points: one, ethno-
symbolism gives due importance to the cultural resources and its symbolic derivation vis-à-
vis the material substructure of modernists; second, nations are not a posterior to nationalism 
in the understating of ethno-symbolism; and finally, ethno-symbolism attempts to disentangle 
the concept of a nation from a nation-states.
72
   
 
Like the primordial school, ethno-symbolism seeks to understand the subjective and the inner 
dimensions of nations by studying the emotional bond that brings members of a nation in a 
given reciprocal solidarity. Nevertheless, ethno-symbolism, unlike primordialism, rejects any 
form of essentialism, either cultural or biological. It departs from situational understanding of 
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ethnic relations and ethnicity as formulated by Fredrick Barth’s Ethnic Groups and 
Boundaries.
73
   
 
Although ethno-symbolism, like perennialists, regards the pre-modern period as a relevant 
historical framework to understand the process of nation formation, ethno-symbolism differs 
from perennialists’ tradition that views ethnic entities and nations as recurrent social and 
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My initial experience, which latter developed into the main research questions of the current 
thesis are the result of my encounter with the modernist horizon of interpretation. The 
modernist paradigm takes the modern era as an a priori to explain nationalism, while 
relegating nation to a secondary importance as being merely the logical outcome of 
nationalism.
1
 Given that the historicity of the modern era is deeply embedded within the 
history of Europe,  such interpretation implicitly elevated Europe as the origin of nationalism, 
and by-implication the nation itself.  
On the contrary, Africa and other non-European parts of the world are relegated to a 
peripheral status, depicted as passive receivers of the processes of nation formation and 
nationalism either as a result of colonial legacy or through other modes of diffusion 
mechanisms.
2
 To what extent is the origin of a nation is embedded in the modern era 
temporally and in European historicity spatially? This is the main methodological question on 
which the overall framework of the current thesis is grounded. 
As part of the above methodological question, how can we resolve a methodological dilemma 
of the following nature? On the one hand, there is curiosity to understand the idea of a nation 
using all theoretical literature in the field, which basically constitute a European
3
 discursive 
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unit. On the other hand, there is also a strong desire to understand a nation from a new 
perspective, leaning on Horn of African, in particular on Oromo’s historical specificity during 
the 16
th
 century. In order to bridge this gap, and look for possible connections between these 
two tasks, it is indispensable “To Think Methodologically,”
4
 to use the apt expression of 
Paula Saukko.  The main task of the present chapter is, therefore, to address this essential part 
of the thesis. Thus the present chapter is devoted to the task of methodological pondering.   
Why does it seem that thinking methodologically is indispensable? We presume that an MA 
undertaking is part of a research tradition that seeks to generate its justification from the 
methodological positions it takes. Thus the current section could be considered as the 
methodological foundation of the present MA thesis. Any methodological position taken in 
the current chapter needs to justify both the overall structure of the thesis and its various 
pieces.  
In addition, owing to the inevitability of scope delimitation and constraints of other natures, 
our methodology will be instrumental to maintain a justifiable shape and content for the 
thesis under discussion. Equally importantly, however, our methodology needs to illuminate 
the limitations inherent to the current MA thesis. To this end, whenever it seems important 
and convenient, the thesis will attempt to declare its limitations as part of a self-reflection 
activity. Yet, it must be underscored that only those limitations of which the writer is aware 
of at the time of writing this thesis will be highlighted in every moments of reflexivity.   
“Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?” What is a nation?  
Ever since Ernest Renan delivered his famous lecture in 1882; the question that he raised at 
that platform as part of the title of his presentation, “Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?”
5
 has remained 
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unresolved —even though a lot has been written on the subject matter since then. For 
instance, a book published in 2005 in honor of Anthony D. Smith on the occasion of his 
retirement as professor emeritus highlighted some fundamental questions concerning the idea 
of a nation.   
According to the editors of this book, “the foci of the ever-expanding body of literature on 
nations and nationalism are the four basic questions: ‘what,’ ‘when,’ ‘why’ and 
‘how.’…What is a nation?; When have nation and nationalism come into being?; Why are 
there nations and nationalism?; How are nations and nationalism formed?”
6
 The book is a 
proceeding of “the fourteenth annual conference of the Association for the study of Ethnicity 
and Nationalism (ASEN)”
7
 which staged a debate in April 2004 under the theme, “When is 
the Nation?” 
Still today, no authoritative work has been produced which can fully address these four focal 
questions. Competing theories and models have been mushrooming but we still lack an 
overarching interpretation concerning nations.
8
 The current thesis wishes to depart from two 
questions that appear to be the same at face value, but have in fact different implications from 
within. The first question is, “When is a Nation?” The second is, “When is the Nation?”  To 
appreciate the difference, it is useful to consider how John Breuilly contextualized a similar 
set of questions in order to highlight their respective implications: 
Smith distinguishes the sociological question: ‘When is a nation?’ from the historical 
question ‘When is the nation?’ As a sociologist he gives priority to the first question, 
considering what he regards as the key ethno-symbolic processes which combine to form 
nations, before considering the historical record for the formation of specific nations. As a 
historian I proceed in the opposite direction, asking whether Smith’s way of framing the 
question about nation formation helps in the understanding of particular cases.
9
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It is the interest of the present thesis to adopt Smith’s classification, without actually giving a 
priority to one question over the other. Rather, this thesis seeks to understand the two 
questions though we dare not claim that a balance between the two perspectives is feasible. 
Having such position, however, presents another methodological dilemma in itself: How can 
we understand the nation diachronically without losing sight of its synchronic aspect? Or, the 
question still remains relevant when it is stated in a reverse manner.  What does this imply 
methodologically?  
To maintain a balance between the synchronic and diachronic levels of analysis; Reinhhart 
Koselleck’s seminal work, Begriffsgechichte [History of Concepts], is helpful in this case for 
it provides us with a methodological insights. Before showing as to how Koselleck’s work 
could be connected to the present thesis, it seems plausible to briefly introduce the History of 
Concepts.  
History of concepts, or conceptual history as used variably today by some affiliated 
intstitutions with history of concepts,
10
 “directed itself to criticizing the practice in the history 
of ideas of treating ideas as constants, assuming different historical forms but of themselves 
fundamentally unchanging.”
11
 Thus the main subject matters of conceptual history are those 
ideas highly embedded in the socio-political and historical contexts. Yet, the ideas per se are 
not the interest of conceptual history. The focus is rather on the changing aspects of those 




Working “with a pairs of concepts that are characterized by their claim to cover the whole of 
humanity,”
13
 Koselleck has brilliantly demonstrated how the synchronic and diachronic 
levels of analysis could be combined.  This is one of those methodological insights that the 
current thesis attempts to capitalize on. It must be stated here that we are aware of the risk 
when a claim is made to bring the synchronic level of inquiry in harmony with the diachronic 
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one. It has been one of those methodological issues that have dragged historians and 
sociologists into fierce debates with each other.
14
  
Without losing sight on the precarious aspect of the above issue, the current thesis thus 
attempts to play within a common ground that may help to make such methodological 
compromise between historical and sociological levels of inquiries. If our inquiry departs 
from a methodological claim that presumes a nation as a concept representing a given set of 
socio-historical phenomenon, then such conception plausible renders us the possibility of 
playing in a common ground that we are aspiring for. To justify the above claim and to 
illustrate as to how the synchronic-diachronic conjecture could be feasible; the following 
quoted passages from Koselleck could be very helpful:  
‘…in the history of a concept it became possible to survey the contemporary space of 
experience and horizon of expectation, and also to investigate the political and social 
functions of a concepts, together with their specific modality of usage, such that(in short) a 
synchronic analysis also took account of situation and conjecture.’ 
‘Such a procedure has of the necessity to translate words of the past and their meanings into 
our understanding. Each history of word or concept leads from a determination of past 
meanings for us. Insofar as this procedure is reflected in the method of Begriffsgechichte, the 
synchronic analysis of the past is supplemented diachronically. Diachrony has the 
methodological obligation of scientifically defining a new inventory of past meanings of 
words.’ 
15
    
How sound is our methodological claim when we consider a nation as a concept representing 
some kind of socio-historical phenomenon? Though there are some studies that conceive 
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nations as “‘real’ sociological communities,”
16
 we refrain from buying into such conception 
of a nation at least at this early stage of the thesis. For now, we prefer to suggest a nation as a 
conventionally sets of representations in relation to some kind of socio-historical 
phenomena
17
 by which we reduce any implication that may appeal to any notion of reality. 
Whether a nation represents an empirical reality or not needs to be subject of scrutiny by 
itself.  
If we restrict a nation as some kind of socio-historical phenomenon which can only be 
understood through its conceptual apparatus, then such conception give us the advantage to 
see into what is represented by the concept and that part of the same phenomenon which is 
left aloof by the same concept.
18
 In other words, we rely on Nicholas Davey’s observation 
when he reminds us that since “an object is always in excess of its concepts, a constellation of 
conceptual coordinates is required to gain fix on its characteristics.”
19
 A lot has been written 
in the field of nation and nationalism in order to highlight various aspects of the phenomenon 
referred to as a nation.  
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It is important to ask here: Do these conceptual constellations and coordinates give us a full 
picture of the phenomenon under consideration? As it will be justified later both within the 
current chapter and elsewhere, it is the conviction of the current thesis that some limitations 
exist in the modernists’ understating of a nation. To put it otherwise, the prevailing concepts 
of a nation, which are the products of modernists’ view, are not adequate to fully represent 
the phenomenon of a nation. It is thus the methodological conviction of the current thesis to 
highlight theses limitations within the dual aspect of a nation by exposing a gap between 
nation as phenomenon and the prevailing conceptual coordinates that are understood as a 
representation of this phenomenon.      
Before illustrating the claim that has been made in the previous paragraph, it is helpful to get 
an insight how Koselleck understands a concept. According to him, “a political or social 
agency is first constituted through concepts by means of which it circumscribes itself and 
hence excludes others, and therefore, by means of which it defines itself…concepts are 
needed within which the group can recognize and define itself, if it wishes to present itself as 
functioning agency…” 
20
 Keeping Kosslecks’ explanation about a concept in mind, now let 
us generate an illustration that could possibly highlight the connection with our thesis leaning 
on some historical cases from European fore-thinkers of a nation.  
We draw on some common features from the speeches of Johan Gottlieb Fichte and Ernest 
Renan who are among the foremost architects of the concepts of a nation. Though these two 
renowned figures lived at a different time and in different localities, one can possibly draw 
some level of analogy between them. Fichte gave his speech entitled “‘Address to the 
German Nation’ whilst Berlin was under French occupation after Prussia’s disastrous defeat 
at the Battle of Jena in 1806, [and] is widely regarded as a founding document of German 
nationalism.”
21
 In 1871, France unconditionally surrendered after its defeat by the North 
German Confederation at the battle of Sedan. As part of the peace treaty concluded between 
the two parties, France was forced to cede Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. Almost eight 
decades after Fichte’s speech, Renan made his famous speech in 1882.
22
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Using the above historical cases in point, some retrospective assumptions of the following 
nature could be made at the risk of teleological tendency. First, both Fichte and Renan were 
possibly prompted by their respective historical experiences in which their respective 
experiences served as relevant contexts in the formulation of a nation from different angles.  
This also means that the two fore-thinkers have selectively interpreted history in a way their 
interpretations provide justification for their respective model of a nation.  Second, one can 
trace from their speeches the categories of “we” and “other” though these categories are not 
explicitly stated in the case of Renan’s speech. Thus one may conjure that the abstract 
essence of Germany represented the idea of a nation in the mind of Fichte. Likewise, for 
Renan, France and a nation represented two sides of the same coin whereupon the former 
represented his empirical resources whereas the latter seems to be the conceptual 
representation of France in his mind.
23
  
We have been interested in the previous two cases primarily because the two cases are 
instrumental to illustrate as to how some experiences in the past can be translated into a 
historical context when some important formulations concerning a nation have been made. 
We are also interested to see as to how the author’s socio-historical and political contexts 
frame his thought and ultimately how a nation which is partly the outcome of the authors’ 
conceptual representation is affected in such a process.  
From such perspective, thus, now it seems feasible to show where is the basic link between 
the present thesis and Koslleck’s history of concept. For its methodological insight, the 
present thesis seeks to capitalize on Koselleck when he insists that a “concept of expectation 
developed out of a concept filled with experience that had been employed historically or 
theoretically.”
24
  Koselleck goes on to say that: 
The simple use of “we” and “you” establishes a boundary and is in this respect a condition of 
possibility determining a capacity to act. But a ‘we’ group can become a politically effective 
and active unity only through concepts which are more than just a simple names or 
typifications…The concept is not merely a sign for, but also a factor in, political or social 
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.There are innumerable concepts of this kind which, while being concretely 
applied, have a general utility. An acting agency might, therefore, define itself as a polis, 
people, party, Stand[city], society, church, or state …In such cases, a given group , makes an 




On the basis of the previous remark from Kosselleck, it is the conviction of the present thesis 
that the modernist understanding of a nation is ‘Euro-centric’ for modern Europe is 
considered as the cradle of the phenomenon referred to as a nation. Through such exclusive 
claim to universality to the phenomenon of a nation, it has become hardly possible to 
consider other socio-historical specificities outside modern European context as a nation. 
As evidenced in the discussion that has been made so far, Koselleck’s work remains very 
helpful in our endeavor that attempts to understand nation as a concept. His fresh look on 
temporality as a result of “‘Space of Experience’ and ‘Horizon of Expectation’: Two 
Historical Categories,”
26
 has also been an important conceptual tool for us especially while 
framing the present methodologically focused chapter of the thesis.
27
    
As it has been attempted to show, a nation has been first conceptualized leaning basically on 
German and French empirical generalizations. When we give an emphasis to the significant 
role the self- representation played in the formulation of a nation, we may claim that from the 
onset a nation has been used as a mechanism of self-representation that ultimately ends up 
with a claim to exclusive claim to generality.  We may also claim that such formulations that 
are made on the basis of specific empirical generalizations can be considered as a prelude to 
the normative order that is today referred as theories of nation and nationalism.  
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One basic question needs to be raised here: To what extent does the present thesis depend on Koselleck’s 
conceptual history approach? Though the present thesis capitalize on some methodological and conceptual insights 
from Koselleck’s history of concept, the thesis slightly rely on Koselleck’s history of concept. As for instance, while 
Koselleck main emphasis is on “The Historical-Political Semantics of Asymmetric Counter-concepts,” we are only 
interested with the concept of a nation in its entirety to be understood hermeneutically. Though concepts like tribe and 
ethnie could be counter-posed dialectically in relation to a nation, a nation will remain the sole core concept that takes 
the lion’s share of our engagement. Yet, Koselleck’s asymmetric concepts will be very insightful when we try to 
understand what makes the nation different from either a tribe or an ethnie. This will be a task that awaits us to be 





The dual aspects of a nation, on the one hand a particular kind of socio-historical 
phenomenon; on the other hand, a conceptual representation of that kind of phenomenon, are 
internally in contradiction to each other. This is primarily true because the universal 
normative order that circumscribes the phenomenon of a nation has to generate its validity 
from the richness of world history.  
In order to resolve such contradiction, a lot has been produced concerning a nation; either 
theoretically focused ones or kind of empirically induced generalizations. Yet, the yields are 
still meager as far as we are looking for an overarching theory and universally accepted 
working definition for the concept of a nation.
28
 Nation and nationalism are still as 
controversial, ambiguous and debatable as they have been so for the past two centuries.
29
  
It is within such frame of mind that we seek to understand one of those methodological 
dilemmas that have been indicated elsewhere before. At the risk of redundancy, let us drag 
one of these methodological dilemmas here and restate it once again. How can we understand 
the phenomenon of a nation using a European concept but through the telescope of specific 
social reality outside Europe? To put it otherwise, to what extent does nation as a universal 
normative order remain valid when it is understood from the vantage point of the history of 
the Oromo society during the 16
th
 century?  
It must be evident that the present thesis does not pretend to resolve the aforementioned 
internal contradiction within the dual aspect of a nation. Such a contradiction remains to pose 
a challenge even for distinguished scholars in the statue of Anthony D. Smith, let alone for 
the current researcher who is by far short on the required academic levels, research skills and 
life experience, neither is the scope of the present thesis capable of accommodating a 
problem of such magnitude.  
As a student coming from Africa and encountered with predominantly ‘Euro-centric’ 
discourse of a nation, the thesis ultimately reflects the intellectual effort of someone who is 
caught up in the middle of two different contexts of experiences. There is a contradiction 
between the conventional understanding of a nation that is predominantly ‘Euro-centric’ and 
the kind of African empirical reality from where this student comes.  
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Thus the thesis can be considered as an effort that seeks to understand the source of such 
contradiction that is inherent within the concept of a nation. 
30
 To what extent could such 
different layers of experience, accumulated in the life span of an individual, be used 
methodologically
31
 for the understanding of the concept of a nation and its inherent internal 
contradiction? 
In order to address the puzzle which is posed awhile before, the present thesis seeks to draw 
on Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics. As a point of transition to 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics understanding, let us first build on J.E McGuire and Barbara 
Tuchanska’s relevant observation concerning the link between the process of concept 
formation and historical-hermeneutics:  
The process of concept-formation is always shaped by the Hermeneutic Circle: It starts from 
foremeanings, because which always understand in light of our anticipating prejudgments and 
prejudices, and their content develops until meanings are established and combined into a 
new conceptual whole. Foremeanings of a given tradition are either concepts inherited from 
an older tradition or preconcepts elaborated in opposition to it…So from the historical-
hermeneutic perspective, the process of concept-formation cannot be separated from the 
process of the appropriation of existing concepts.
32
   
As a methodological stance, we build on the last few sentences of this passage, leaving those 
that concern the issue of hermeneutic circle to be discussed later. We would like to capitalize 
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If the discussion concerning the student’s life experiences in the middle of the methodological discussion 
creates some feeling of discomfort, one may find a comfort in the following quoted passage. A student’s life 
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For the sake of convenience regarding this issue, the following instances hopefully prove helpful. As for 
instance, “The Hermeneutic priority of the question,” Gadamer asserts that “…the structure of the question is implicit 
in all experiences. We cannot have experience without asking questions.” He then shows as to how our questions lead 
us to understand meanings in the spirit of hermeneutic experience. Let us see this connection in Gadamer own words.  
“The close relation between questioning and understanding is what gives the hermeneutic experiences its true 
dimension…,” thus for Gadamer, “To understand a question means to ask it. To understand meaning is to understand 
it as the answer to a question.”  Cf. Ibid, 356, 367-368. Nicholas Davey who has brilliantly simplified Gadamer’s 
Philosophical Hermeneutics underlines the point which states that “Philosophical Hermeneutics Promotes a 
Philosophy of Experience.” Cf. Davey, Unquiet Understanding, 5-6.      
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on the connection between concept-formation and the process of appropriation of existing 
concepts.  
As it has been discussed earlier, the process of concept-formation in relation to the issue of 
“what is a nation?” has been highly embedded in ‘European’, particularly ‘West European’ 
socio-cultural, political, economic and historical contexts, that is, in a European historicity.
33
 
As the process of concept-formation involves, either overtly or covertly, ‘exclusive claim to 
generality,’ as indicated previously with a quote from Koselleck, the concept of a nation has 
been appropriated into the larger canvas of ‘European-self’  vis-à-vis its multilayered and 
multidimensional ‘otherness.’  
Having born and raised in Ethiopia, which is part of the “other” in the context of the above 
discussion, how can I properly understand the concept of a nation which is no less the 
expression of the ‘European-self’? Such effort brings ultimately an encounter between my 
experience that has been shaped by the kind of socio-historical specificities in Ethiopia and 
my expanding horizon of experience which is the result of my exposure to the concept of a 
nation through my readings of European literature concerning nation and nationalism. While 
explicating a point from Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Research and its connection 
with “the concept and phenomenon of the horizon,” Gadamer holds that a “horizon is not a 
rigid boundary but something that moves with one and invites one to advance further.”
34
    
To make sense of my layers of experience within the ever shifting horizon, it is helpful to 
notice that “it is experience itself that opens us to the possibility of further experience,”
35
 as 
Gadamer noted. Therefore, I would say that I am driven into the present research endeavor 
due to those two different layers of my horizon of experiences that are contradictory to each 
other. This thesis, therefore, should be considered as an attempt to make use of hermeneutic 
practice in order to understand a nation by merging these two contradictory perspectives 
about a nation; to understand the predominantly ‘Euro-centric’ concept of a nation from the 
vantage point of the specificity of the Oromo polity during the 16
th
 century.  
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The ultimate outcome of such understanding of a nation can be referred to as a ‘fusion of 
horizons’ in relation to the phenomenon of a nation. What do we mean by ‘fusion of 
horizons?’ For reasons of convenience and to justify the possibility of portraying the present 
thesis as a piece within the backdrop of hermeneutic practice, let us explain these important 
concepts and few others in a way our endeavor illuminates the connection between our thesis 
and hermeneutic practice.   
In the frame of the above discussion, let us borrow one important question from Gadamer: 
“What consequences for understanding follow from the fact that belonging to a tradition is a 
condition of hermeneutics?”
36
 The question serves as a transition into the following concepts 
such as ‘Hermeneutic Circle,’ ‘fusion of horizons,’ ‘horizon,’ ‘finitude’ and ‘vantage points.’  
Gadamer underlines that “we must understand the whole in terms of the detail and the detail 
in terms of the whole.”   
Such interplay between part and whole in the process of understanding is referred as 
‘Hermeneutic Circle,’ to use brilliantly crafted phrase from Martin Heidegger.
37
 For 
Gadamer, Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle is a “decisive turning point”
38
 as far as 
hermeneutic understanding is considered. This is because; Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle   
powerfully expounds the context in which the process of hermeneutics understanding can be 
achieved to a greater extent.
39
 Citing Heidegger, Gadamer explains the relationship between 
hermeneutic circle and tradition in the following way:  
Heidegger describes the circle in such a way that the understanding of the text remains 
permanently determined by the anticipatory movement of fore-understanding. The circle of 
whole and part is not dissolved in perfect understanding but, on the contrary, is most fully 
realized. The circle is not formal in nature. It is neither subjective nor objective, but [it] 
describes understanding as the interplay of movement of tradition and the movement of the 
interpreter…Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition: rather, we produce it ourselves 
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Keeping Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle in mind, how can we make sense of its application 
to our thesis? Two points are important here: Firstly, when it has been claimed that the 
concept of a nation forms an essential part of a European discursive unit, then we implicitly 
also suggest that European scholars play a pivotal role in formulating the theories of nation 
and nationalism. This can give us a glimpse into the process by which these scholars have 
been influenced by their respective ‘European’ tradition when formulating their theories of 
nation and nationalism. Their theories have in turn further extended the conceptual 
understanding of nation and nationalism, which has formed and thus represent an established 
tradition by itself.  
Secondly, and most importantly, the present research endeavor can also be considered as part 
of the circular movement of understanding of the tradition concerning a nation, but from 
fresh temporal and spatial perspectives.  The current thesis attempts to infuse an African 
oriented specific fore-tradition of the researcher into an already well-established European 
tradition that circumscribes the phenomenon of a nation.  
Owing to the fact that nation has been predominantly conceptualized by European scholars; it 
is evident that these scholars have been under the constraint of their respective fore-tradition 
that is basically embedded in socio-historical specificity peculiar to Europe. This is also true 
for the current thesis that is the result of the researcher’s encounter of a European oriented 
tradition wherein the concept of a nation is grounded.  
Such hermeneutic encounter has come into surface only because the researcher attempts to 
understand the problem of a nation without being liberated from the shackles of his own fore-
understanding that is highly embedded on the tradition derived from the history of the Oromo 
people. When it is claimed as a methodological stance that the concept of a nation is 
‘Eurocentric’, then through by-implication, it is evident that the current researcher’s endeavor 
is equally ‘Afro-centric’ for it attempts to understand the concept of a nation from the 
vantage point of an African perspective.  






If we declare right from the onset that our position, the methodological stance guiding the 
current project is ‘Afro-centric’ endeavor, what kind of implication will this have then on the 
nature of our endeavor? According to Gadamer, the “consciousness of being affected by 
history […] is primarily consciousness of the hermeneutical situation…The very idea of a 




The fact that we cannot avoid to position ourselves outside the history that forms an enclave 
around us, such reality informs us about our inherent limitation that confines our vision and 
thinking. Using the idea of inherent limitation in human experience as a segue, let us turn to 
how Gadamer explicates the concept of horizon and its related features. Gadamer argues: 
Every finite person has its limitation. We define the concept of “situation” by saying that it 
represents a standpoint that limits the possibility of vision. Hence essential to the concept of 
situation is the concept of “horizon.” The Horizon is the range of vision that includes 
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point. Applying this to the thinking 
mind, we speak of narrowness of horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon, of the 
opening up of new horizons, and so forth… A person who has an  horizon knows the relative 
significance of everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small. 
Similarly, working out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right horizon of 
inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition.
42
   
Using the concept of horizon so brilliantly expounded by Gadamer in the above passage, now 
we can address the question: What do we mean by ‘fusion of Horizon?’ This question also 
has to address the dilemma whether our methodological stance is justifiable or not, for being 
it is motivated by an ‘Afro-centric’ perspective. Hermeneutic understanding requires one to 
re-examine the legitimacy of his/her fore-understating when an encounter is made with a text, 
in our case the vast European literature that deals about a nation.  
Such exercise helps the researcher to be well aware of his biased position that distracts his 
understanding of the concept of a nation. Gadamer insists that the “important thing is to be 
aware of one’s own biases, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus 










asserts its own truth against one’s own fore-meanings.”
43
 Once the task of self-understanding 
is accomplished, the concept of a nation as a European discursive unit can be fruitfully 
encountered.  
In light of the above discussion, Gadamer notes that a “person who is trying to understand a 
text is always projecting. He projects meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial 
meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading 
the text with particular expectations in regard to certain meaning...”
44
 In such context of the 
process of hermeneutic circle, every hermeneutic encounter is preceded by a particular 
projection of meaning on the part of the interpreter, forming a constant process that 
“constitutes the movement of understating and interpretation.”
45
  
Throughout the whole thesis, utmost effort will be exerted to encounter the concept of a 
nation in its “alterity.” This is a clear intent of our endeavor to comply with Gadamer’s 
assertion, which warns us that “…a hermeneutic trained consciousness must be, from the 
start, sensitive to the text’s alterity.”
46
 In such a way, eventually, what is called the ‘fusion of 
horizons’ occurs through the process of understanding. The fusion of horizon occurs in 
dialectical fashion, to mean that the interpreter’s horizons are fused to form a horizon of a 
different level and expanse. The new horizon takes shape the moment the interpreter 
understands the original meaning of the text and when in turn he adds his own perspective to 
the process, enriching thus the original meaning of the texts.
47
 
To sum up what has been written so far with the goal of positioning the current thesis as a 
self-training activity in the framework of hermeneutic practice, let us capitalize on the 
following relevant points. We reassert that the theories that have so far been developed to 
address the problem of nation and nationalism are the results of socio-historical contexts that 
are mainly within the confinement of European singularities. This is true primarily because 
most of the main architects of theories of nation and nationalism are European scholars.  



















These scholars have been thus under the constraint of their socio-historical milieu which has 
an impact on their horizon of experience. To illustrate the assertion that has been made 
awhile ago, Nicholas Davey’s argument is important when he explains his phrase, “Finitude 
of All Thought and Experience.”
48
 Davey strongly argues that a “leitmotif that virtually 
defines philosophical hermeneutics is the conviction that all human experience is particular 
and finite.”
49
 Connecting his argument with Heidegger, Davey highlights his source as, 
“Faithful to Heidegger’s ontological axiom of thrownness (Geworfenheit), it maintains that 




Therefore, the present thesis is a reflection of the “embattled self” of the current researcher 
whose ‘self’ continuously repositions itself in a situation that generates “a polarity of 
familiarity and strangeness”
51
 in its encounter with the dual aspect of a nation. Such situation 
of a “polarity of familiarity and strangeness” is articulated as a “being in-between” 
whereupon “the true locus of Hermeneutics” is located.
52
 It should be noted, however, that 
the intent to bring the present thesis within the shade of hermeneutic practice presents further 
methodological complexities that we have to be careful of. 
How can we resolve the strong textual presence in our effort to understand a nation 
hermeneutically? Does our endeavor consider a nation as a text when it attempts to employ 
hermeneutic practice that is focused on textual understanding? As mentioned earlier, we have 
presumed that a nation has a dual attributes: the concept of a nation and the phenomenon that 
is believed to be represented by these conceptual coordinates. By using its conceptual 
coordinates as frame of reference, one can argue that nation has a textual attribute which 
facilitates the process of understanding of a nation.  
If we look into the context in which world history is understood as a text by Gadamer, then 
through analogy we can extend Gadamer’s logic into our case. Before we attempt to extend  
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Gadamer’s logic to our case, it is important to envisage the connection between world history 
and a nation as in the following way: First, to consider world history and the phenomenon of 
a nation as some kind of phenomena which are the object of our understanding; second, the 
concepts of a nation and sources of world history as means towards understanding these 
phenomena; and third, the need to locate the phenomenon referred as a nation within the 
larger canvas of world history, or to consider the former one as a part within the latter that 
can be considered as a whole.  
After having such frame of mind, now we can see the importance of Gadamer’s argument 
when he notes that “it is not just that sources are texts, but historical reality itself is a text that 
has to be understood…Thus the foundation for the study of history is hermeneutics.”
53
 
Gadamer further elaborates his argument in the following manner:   
The context of world history - in which appears the true meaning of the individual objects, 
large or small, of historical research – is itself a whole, in terms of which the meaning of 
every particular is to be fully understood, and which in turn can be fully understood only in 
terms of these particulars. World history is, as it were, the great dark book, the collected work 




On the basis of Gadamer’s arguments, therefore, we can consider nation as a text, either a 
phenomenon assuming one particular mode of human existence within the larger canvas of 
world history or having its own established tradition in the field of nation and nationalism. In 
this context, the present research endeavor can also be considered as a part of the tradition 
that seeks to understand the phenomenon of a nation.  
 On the other hand, we also have to resolve another pressing methodological issue. Why does 
the present thesis engage merely with a nation and neglects nationalism as if a nation had an 
exclusive and independent existence within the study of nation and nationalism? How can 
this thesis reconcile the fact that it mentions nation and nationalism in various places and 
takes a nation as its sole subject matter?  
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On the contrary, we cannot avoid using the expressions ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ inside this 
thesis since most studies consider the two concepts as a twin concepts in the field of nation 
and nationalism. Thus the treatment of one concept ultimately forces one to mention the other 
concept at least in some contexts for the two concepts are highly interrelated though they are 
not universally considered as necessarily interdependent to each other.  
On the other hand, we are under a methodological constraint that seriously limits the scope of 
study at this level of graduate study. Although the researcher has come into the experience of 
hermeneutic encounter equally against nationalism as well, we have limited our endeavor in 
such way, therefore, to comply with the delimitation of the scope of the study that have 
brought us under constraints of time and other practical factors.  
According to Elizabeth Anne Kinsella who is a specialist in qualitative research method, 
“qualitative research is by its very nature informed by hermeneutic thought.”
55
 She justifies 
her position by arguing that “given that the emphasis in qualitative research is on 
understanding and interpretation…and the parallel emphasis is evident in hermeneutic 
thought, where for instance Gadamer…demonstrates that understanding (verstehen) is the 
universal link in all interpretation of any kind, the connection between qualitative research 
and hermeneutic thought becomes self-evident.”
56
  
Once the link between qualitative research and hermeneutic practice has been established, it 
can be stated that the current research has been grounded on qualitative research method.  
Our sources consist of texts of various kinds. For our engagement with the concept of a 
nation, we have been using theoretical literature that constitutes basically part of European 
discursive unit/ tradition. To understand the concept of a nation from the vantage point of 
Oromo society during the 16
th
 century, both primary and secondary nature of historical 
sources has been used.  
As a supplement to those historical sources at our disposal, we have also exploited some 
ethnographic materials that have been collected by some renowned ethnographers as far as 
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Oromo ethnography is considered. These ethnographic materials help us to understand the 
working of the gada system from the present perspective. Although the symbolic importance 
of the gada system still reverberates among current Oromo generations, the system as a full-
fledge indigenous form of local institution has merely survived in some areas of today’s 
Oromia Regional State. These ethnographic materials are basically collected from the Borana 
of Oromo whose gada system is considered as a prototype of the Oromo gada system during 
the 16
th
 century.   
Viewing the current chapter as a foundation for the overall thesis, the other three chapters are 
harmonized among each other through the current chapter in a way each chapter plays its 
own respective role so that the thesis in its totality renders a unity of meaning. As an 
introductory chapter, the previous chapter of the thesis has provided the historiographical 
context in which human horizon of experience has been finite and limited. As a result of such 
finitude aspect of human experience, the same chapter has highlighted the inevitable 
dynamism that highly characterizes the knowledge base in relation to the field of study that 
considers nation and nationalism as its subject matters.  
Chapter three will provide an empirical context to counter the modernist orthodoxy that 
claims nation is a mere outcome of the European modern period. Chapter three will expose an 
internal contradiction; that is inherent in the process of understanding of a Nation as a 
universal phenomenon, but only as a logical outcome of European specificity. Chapter four 
will build both on the implicit and explicit conjectures of chapter three by illustrating that the 
socio-historical contexts that have been used as a background in the process of formulating 
the concept of a nation have basically been European centered.  
Consequently, Chapter four will attempt to verify the methodological presumption that states 
human horizon of experience is limited and finite. In such manner, the overall thesis will 
show that the modernist spatial and temporal impositions on the phenomenon of a nation are 
insufficient to have a universal appeal. To have such unity of meaning among different parts 
of the thesis, and also between the thesis and its parts; therefore, the current methodological 






Who were the Oromo during the 16
th
 Century? 
Empirical and Conceptual Discussions 
The present chapter attempts to accomplish two basic tasks: First, to describe the Oromo 
polity during the 16
th
 century; second, to understand the Oromo polity in the same period by 
using concepts such as tribe, ethnie and nation. Corresponding to these two tasks; the chapter 
consists of two subsections. The first will be a descriptive one, allowing the ethnographic past 
of the Oromo society to speak for itself.
1
  
The second subsection, in contrast, will provide an interpretive discussion, integrating the 
chapter’s descriptive part into the overall argument of the thesis. In so doing, some level of 
logical coherence will be achieved not only in between of the two subsections, but also 
among various parts of the whole thesis.   






 century, the Oromo had a common monotheist religion. They believed in 
Waqa. Karl Knutsson posits a parallelism between Oromo’s monotheisms and that of ancient 
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Inspired by Asmerom Legesse’s phrase, “let the ethnography tell.” The basic sources for the historical and 
ethnographic description of the current subsection are past historical sources and current ethnographic materials. As 
far as the former kinds of sources are considered, we will make use of written historical sources since the 16
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 century 
all through the 21
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 century. I his seminal work about the gada system, Legesse has brilliantly brought into light the 
structural aspects of the Borana ethnography. According to him, since the gada system has fully survived and is still 
practiced in full scale by the Borana Oromo of Ethiopia, Legesse argues the Borana gada system remains a prototype 
of the gada system during the 16
th
 century. Outside the Borana of Ethiopia, one may also find the gada system among 
the Guji Oromo, even if this underwent some periods of decline and hence subject for more modification as compared 
to the Borana of Oromo. Outside the two groups, the Borana and Guji Oromo, some traces of the gada system could 
only be seen. Combining the historical sources with current ethnographic materials; therefore, help to grasp the overall 
system of the gada system during the 16
th
 century from the present understanding. Cf. Getachew Haile, tarns. and ed., 
Abba Bahery’s Essay’s: Other Documents Concerning the Oromo(Minnesota: Avon, 2002) [In this compilation of 
various essays and documents: there is an original 16
th
 century Ge’ez manuscript of Abba Bahery; the Amharic 
translations by Getachew Haile; an English translation by Charles Bekingeham; and other original 19
th
 c sources 
concerning the Oromo in the appendixes.]; for the Borana gada system as a prototype of the Oromo gada system 
during the 16
th
 century, see Legesse, Gada: Three Approaches to the Study of African Society(New York: The Free 
Press, 1973); for the practice of the gada system among the Guji Oromo, see John Thomas Hinnant, “The Gada 
System of the Guji of Southern Ethiopia” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1977.); see also Dereje Hinew, 
“Historical Significance of Some Major Gadaa Centers in Oromia” (master’s thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2005).           






 Lambert Bartels who has made an extensive study into the religion of 
the Oromo maintains that waqa displays a duality in the Oromo believe system, the term 
referring to both a supreme deity and the sky where it is believed to reside in.
3
  
According to the Oromo belief system, the ayana and qallu function as a bridge between the 
worshipers and waqa. While the ayana are divine spirits, the qallu are human individuals 
who, after being possessed by the ayana, perform the task of mediation.
4
 The qallu was 
similar to a high priest, and served as a spiritual leader for the Oromo community.  Some 
sources, based on some mythical narratives of the Oromo people, attribute even divine origin 
to the first qallu.
5
 Mohammed Hassen describes the importance of the qallu within the 
Oromo community in the past in the following way: 
“The qallu institution and its relation with waqa were the core of traditional religion. Adult 
men visited the qallu for blessing. This brings us to the story of Abba Muda. ‘The term muda, 
when used by itself is the name of the ceremony that is celebrated once every eight years in 
honor of the qallu.’ The muda ceremony [pilgrimage] was important because it was the point 
at which the qallu institution and the gada system intersected. ‘It is one of the critical foci of 
the Oromo polity.”
6
       
Two forms of authority seemed to reside within the qallu institution during the 16
th
 and 
subsequent centuries. Being the spiritual leaders of the Oromo polity, they also served as 
judges when it came to settle conflicts of greater magnitude.
7
 They also had a symbolic 
political authority owing to the custom that the polity’s newly elected leaders had to be 
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Though some authors mention only the muda ceremony, a ritual conducted by the gada in power in honor 
of the qallu, Legesse alerts us also to other ceremony and pertinent activity of the qallu. He argues that there is also 






anointed by the qallus.
8
 This act constitutes the basic point of intersection between the qallu 
system and the Oromo’s socio-political system, which I will discuss below in more detail.  
The belief system, along with the gada system, defines the overall relationship of the Oromo 
polity to both the ideal divine world and their immediate physical and social surroundings. 
Guyo Duyo, for example, conceptualizes such overall relationship as a ‘life dialogue’. 
According to him, life dialogue can be understood in the following way: 
Life dialogue [is] …a philosophical (i.e. epistemological, metaphysical and ethical), 
historical, and linguistic communication with the conceivable, memorable and predictable 
aspects of life through their respective, immediate and concrete situations. ‘Life dialogue’ is 
not a world view; it is rather a social, and individuals’ critical apprehension of their physical, 
metaphysical and spiritual challenges (encounters) with their environments and mental 
perception (metaphysical) of the whole universe. These challenges (encounters) and spiritual 
or mental perceptions are faced and experienced along the perceivable and conceivable 
horizon of time.  Thus, life dialogue consists of both physical and conceptual (metaphysical) 
interaction of human beings with their physical and spiritual environments and the whole 
universe as well.
9 
Before delving into the gada system, it seems appropriate to have a look into another socio-
cultural institution, which demonstrates a level of collective consciousness among the 
Oromo. The Oromo had two adoption mechanisms through which not only individuals, but 
also ‘alien’ communities were adopted by Oromo families and community, respectively.  
The first such practice is called guddifachaa, whereby Oromo parents, usually those who are 
without any offspring, adopt a child at an early age. Then, the dogmas of the institution 
ensure the formation of a strong parent-child bond. Once adopted, the child is considered to 
be the sole offspring of his adopters for his or her life, and adoptive parents are expected to 
treat their adopted child as their true child.   





Guyo Duyo, “The Quest for Re-Grounding African Philosophy between the Two Camps: The Alternative 
and the Binary Conception of African Philosophy” (master’s thesis, Addis Ababa University, 2011), 93; See also as to 
how Gemetchu Megersa explains the Oromo world view using the concepts of ayaana/spirit/, uumaa/the divine and 
physical world comprising the divine being and the living things/ and saffu/the moral category/.Cf. Gemetchu 
Megersa, “The Oromo World View,” a paper presented at the 1
st
 interdisciplinary seminar of the Institute of 
Ethiopian Studies( Nazareth/Ethiopia: Institute of Ethiopian Studies, 1998),41-54. 




Even if later they would end up having a biological child of their own, a differential treatment 
between their adopted and biological children is not allowed by any means. Among the 
Oromo, the bond between the parent and the adopted child must, therefore, remain intact for 
life.  Deviation from such norm is considered a serious social taboo.
10
  
Although guddifachaa also plays pivotal role in assuring social cohesion among the Oromo, 
the institution known as mogaasaa is more important to my thesis. This was a large scale 
adoption mechanism, which was meant to complement the expansive nature of the Oromo 
society during the 16
th
 and subsequent centuries.  
Through the mogaasaa mechanism, the Oromo assimilated communities along their line of 
expansion following the conquest of new territories. While these assimilative instruments 
usually required the ‘assimilated community’ to take an oath of allegiance and vow to live in 
accordance to the Oromo way of life, Oromumma, the host community was also under 
reciprocal obligation of accepting the adopted community as a full-fledged member with 
complete right.
11
Since mogaasaa was contingent on the acceptance of the overall Oromo way 




While Oromization refers to the process, Oromumma refers to the Oromo socio-cultural ethos 
and its political structures. To put it otherwise, Oromumma is both the substantive element of 
the Oromo identity and its over-all ‘life-dialogue’ with its surrounding. Gemetchu Megersa 
who is a renowned Oromo anthropologist defines Oromumma in the following way: 
Orommumma, derived from the name Oromo, refers to all those elements that constitute the 
Oromo personality. This personality is shaped by all those features of the internal and 
external environment that bind the Oromo to their land, with its mountains, rivers, its plants 
and animals, its climates, its seasonal patterns and the other cultures with which it 
interacts…It is anchored in the Oromo language (afaan Oromo, “Oromo mouth”) through 
which the Oromo express their connection to life and land. In short, “Oromoness”[the English 
                                                          
10
Gudifacha is still practiced among the Oromo of Ethiopia. See Mekuria Bulcha, Contours of the Emergent 
and Ancient Oromo Nation: Dilemmas in the Ethiopian Politics of State-and Nation-Building (Cape Town: Center for 











equivalent of Oromumma] is composed of the totality of the Oromo culture… One of the 
most interesting aspects of the Oromo culture can be said to be the way in which the Oromo 
personality, cultural identity, belief system and world view interact and the extent to which 
these features are inter-woven to form a unity of meaning. This unity of meaning has 
remained intact and does not appear to have affected by the diversity and the wide range of 





 century, the gada system formed the basic substantive and structural aspect of 
Oromumma. Asmarom Legesse, who devoted his Ph.D dissertation to the study of the 
structural aspects of the gada system, describes it as follows: 
 The gada system is a system of classes (luba) that succeed each other every eight years in 
assuming military, economic, political, and ritual responsibilities. Each gada class remains in 
power during a specific term (gada) which begins and ends with a formal power transfer ceremony. 
Before assuming a position of leadership, the gada class is required to wage war against a 
community that none of their ancestors had raided. This particular war is known as butta and is 
waged on schedule every eight years. It is this event that was most directly connected with the 
pulsating frontier of their dominions in the 16
th
 century leading toward the conquest of nearly half 
of Ethiopia’s land surface.
14
        
Given the complexity of the gada institution, the aforementioned definition cited from 
Leggesse is very helpful to put the system in its simplest definitional framework.
15
 Hassen 
argues that “gada cannot be given a univocal interpretation. It stands for several related ideas. 
It is first of all the concept standing for the whole way of life.”
16
 Hassen further indicates that 
gada also refers to a specific grade or group of generation in power.  
Therefore, gada represented an overarching institution that provided political, economic and 
socio-cultural functions for the Oromo. In such context, it connotes to both the overall ‘life-
dialogue’ of the Oromo and an aspect that transcends a life span of an individual, as it links 
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To see how the concept gada is difficult to define and it is hardly possible to arrive at a single meaning of 








one generation with the other. In contrast, it has a rather limited application when referring to 
the generational group or the grade (luba) in power.  
Owing to those various layers of understanding that surround the notion of a gada, the system 
appears simple from surface. When one gets deeper in his/her analysis, however, the 
complexity of the system begins to unfold.
17
 Illustrative of this point is Legresse’s description 
of the system:    
The Gada System is an institution that represents an extreme development of a type of 
social structure known to anthropologists as age-sets. Extreme forms are often very 
instructive in the social sciences because they expose in an exaggerated way simple facts 
about human society that we take totally for granted and that, consequently, we do not 
comprehend. The Gada system is an institution that appears so exaggerated that it is 
readily dismissed by laymen and scholars alike as a sociological anomaly. Anomalous 
though it may be, it is one of the most astonishing and instructive turns the evolution of 
human society has taken.
18
     
Although it is not a concern of this project, one important question could be raised here: Can 
the gada system be considered as a unique feature of Oromo? The literature at our disposal 
shows that other Cushitic speaking societies in East Africa have analogous age-sets 
structures. Among age-sets structures, however, there is a great deal of internal variation. 
While some of these systems use age as the only institutional framework, others use 
generational grading as their basic structural mechanism.  
According to Legesse, the Oromo use both systems to address the structural limitations 
inherent within the generational grade. This is not to say that age-based systems are better 
than those systems based on generations. Both sub-systems have their own strength and 
weakness. Given that the Oromo use the generational grading as the main institutional 
framework, the age-system plays only a complementary role.
19
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The following two quotes demonstrate the complexity of the generational type while 
providing at the same time an insight as to why the Oromo are probably using both systems.  
According to C. R. Hallpike:  
Generation-grading systems are…cumbersome and difficult to operate, requiring a 
sophisticated calendar and a number of irksome restraints of a sexual or marital nature, and 
are clearly less effective than true age-grading systems in stratifying society into such basic 
categories as boys, warriors, and elders.
20
  
Legesse sees the complexity of the gada system in the following way: 
Among the [Oromo] of Ethiopia the institution has reached a most remarkable level of 
complexity. There are few institutions in the world that afford us as rich a sociological 
context for the study of the relationship between time and human society as does the case of 
the Borana [Oromo]. Here we find a society that is stratified into two distinct but cross-
cutting systems of peer-group structures. One is a system in which the members of each class 
are recruited strictly on the basis of chronological age. The other is a system in which the 
members are recruited equally strictly on the basis of genealogical generations. The first has 
nothing to do with genealogical ties. The second has little to do with age. Both types of social 
groups are formed every eight years. Both sets of groups pass from one stage of development 
to the next every eight years. All Borana males have a position in both systems.
21
      
A. H. J. Prins produced a PhD dissertation analyzing East African age-sets systems by using 
anthropological comparative approach. One of the issues, which captured his attention, was 
to indentify the particular group that has made the innovation before the system was diffused 
among those other Cushitic groups that are currently still practicing the system. Although 
such studies would enable us to have a total picture about the gada system in particular and 
age-sets systems in general, it is not an easy task to find out who made the first initiative 
before the system became widespread among Cushitic speakers of East Africa. 
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As regards those Cushitic groups that are found outside Ethiopia, Prins confirms that the late 
19
th
 century is the only period to which one can go retrospectively in order to address the 
issue. It is indicated that there is an account about Mwangi/Maina/ peoples of today’s Kenya 
for practicing the age-set system in 1898.
22
  And with regards to those non-Oromo Cushitic 
peoples that reside in Ethiopia, we have no historical record apart from some recent 
ethnographic documents. To address this problem, some scholars used computer simulations 
in order to establish the earliest time when the age-sets systems could have become first 
operational. C. R. Hallpike nevertheless believes that the computer simulations applied to the 
case of the Oromo by Legesse is flawed in some respect and therefore the model seems less 
helpful in this case.
23
 
We have some firsthand historical written sources that documented the practice of the gada 
system among the Oromo as far back as the 16
th
 century. Concerning what happened before 
this century, we are kept in dark and can hardly answer some key questions, such as, how and 
when did the Oromo begin to use these systems? Who made the first innovations in age-sets 
systems?  
Although these questions remain very crucial, they are not the concern of the current project, 
for it is neither interested in the study of ethno-genesis of any of these groups nor in any kind 
of comparison. On the basis of our main historical source that was written during the 16
th
 
century, we can only be sure that the gada system was already operational among the Oromo 
at that time.  
The French missionary Martial de Salviac left his account in 1901 in the following way:  
“considering the antiquity of their custom, the stability of their form of government, M. 
Antoine d’ Abbadie calls the Oromo ‘African conservatives.’ They are that also from another 
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Gada: The Stage of Political Leadership 
Despite contemporary discourses on models of democracy, the gada system could be 
considered as an ‘egalitarian’ political institution. The male members of the Oromo polity 
were classified into generation-sets and gada grades. The generation-sets were a group of 
individuals who were relatively in the same age range and shared the same status.  
The grades on the other hand corresponded to a stage of development along the hierarchically 
and functionally differentiated age plane. Those belonging to a given set of generation were 
supposed to pass through all the grades together, sharing more or less the same 
responsibilities.
25
   
During the 16
th
 century the Oromo had, as Abba Bahery recorded, “neither kings nor masters 
like other peoples; rather they obey a luba for eight years. And after eight years another luba 
is appointed, and the first is relieved.”
26
 Luba refers to the grade that rules the polity for eight 
years. Based on the work of others, such as Abba Bahery, d’Abbadie and de Salviac, G.W.B. 
Hutingford’s sums up the working of the gada system in the following way: 
The Gada System: The Males of every [Oromo] tribe…are comprised within 10 groups called 
gada which are linked in pairs and run in two hemi-cycles of five gada each; to the gada of 
the second hemi-cycle belong the sons of members of the first hemi-cycle…During the first 
40 years of life all males pass through a series of five eight-years periods of initiation, also 
called gada, to each of which they belong in turn for eight years only. The paired gada may 
be distinguished as gada sets, and the eight year initiation periods as gada-grades. Any 
attempt to elucidate the system must be based on the fact that these figures, 5x8= 40…
27
      
According to the functional hierarchy of age-generations, the level of importance and degree 
of public responsibility of each grade increased gradually until it reached the top leadership 
position (acquired by those aged 40 to 48), after which the public responsibility  of the grade 
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decreased. Following retirement, the group’s main function became to serve as advisors to 
the ruling gada/luba and other lower levels of public and non-public preoccupations.
28
 The 
following tables are very helpful to give us insight as to how the generation-sets are 
organized and operate along the hemi-cycle notion of the gada system. 
No Gada Grade Number of years in 
the Gada System 
Number of years (Expected 
age of individuals) 
I  Iti Mako  0-8  8-16  
II  Daballe  8-16  16-24  
III  Folle  18-24  24-32  
IV  Qondala  24-32  32-40  
V  Luba  32-40  40-48  
Figure 5: Table
29
 demonstrating the distribution of generation grades and age sets along the gada system.  
As one can see from the above table, those in the first grade were supposed to take care of 
some simple responsibilities in correspondence to their early age. Typically, they mainly took 
care of calves and did some errands close to home. Those in the second age grade were given 
the responsibility to manage the economic base of the community, that is, the handling of the 
livestock. The third grade was a warrior age grade and was usually not allowed to live among 
the community. This grade was thus supposed to live isolated from the core of the community 
and its members were at this stage not allowed to have their own family.  
When they became fully adults between the age of 32 and 40 approximately, they would be 
allowed to marry and form their own family. This stage was thus a period of transition, with 
the members of this grade functioning as a reserve army stationing within the community 
while also learning the arts of administration and law. Finally, when they were believed to be 
fully matured between the ages of 40 and 48, they would be handed the power of leading the 
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Oromo polity. After the leading luba grade, everyone would descend into yuba, a grade 
allotted to those who retired from power.
30
     
  
Figure 6: The hemi-cyclic notion of the gada system that demonstrates the reciprocal movement of a 
father and his son
31
.  
Seen from today’s perspective, one could possibly argue on the basis of the above reciprocal 
movement of the father and his son in the gada system, that the gada system structurally 
discouraged the formation of dynastic rule in the period. It is hardly possible to say for 
granted whether there was a clear intent to discourage dynastic rule in the mind of those 
agents during the 16
th
 century or before who designed the whole system in such a way. The 
only thing that one can say safely is the fact that the gada system discouraged fathers and 
their sons from being active members in the system at the same time. This is so because a 
child entered into the first grade only when his father has retired from the ruling grade, the 
luba.
32
    
One of the striking aspects of the gada system was the way it differentiated roles and 
responsibilities among various components of the ruling grade. All individuals who passed 







Since no one was allowed to get married before reaching the stage of qondala , that is, when they were 
aged approximately between 32 and 40,  most children would be technically ready for the first class only at the same 
time when their fathers were close to retirement or have already retired from the system. Yet, the validity of such 
reasoning remains sound only if the system is considered in its ideal form. In the course of their expansion in 
subsequent centuries, owing to historical trajectories, the Oromo might have been forced to make some level of 





through the same initiations would form their own assembly following their initiation into the 
luba grade. Thus those who were initiated into the luba grade act as the general assembly for 
the period of eight years. The assembly is called caffee in afaan Oromo.  
The caffee acted as a law making branch of the gada system. According to Asmé-Giorgis, 
19
th
 century Ethiopian chronicler, the main task of luba assembly was “to administer justice, 
to hear the historical and juridical report of the expiring eight years, to criticize some of the 
existing laws, legislate new ones, and proclaim the future law and procedures.”
33
 
In addition, the caffee had to elect from among its members the leader of the whole polity for 
the period of eight years. The elected leader is referred to variously as Abba Boku(father of 
the scepter) and Abba Biyya(father of the country). In addition, based on merit, other main 
roles and responsibilities were also filled by the caffee.  
The main ones were: Abba Dula (father of the army); Abba Hayu(father of knowledge/ 
knowledge in terms of history or collective memory of the Oromo polity); Abba Sera( father 
of law- law repository in past-present continuum); and Abba Sa’a(father of livestock).
34
 Like 
the term gada, the names of each post represent a complex context beyond their respective 
literary English translations. Here is a diagram which could illustrate the structure of 
authority within gada ‘government’. Yet, it must be noted that the diagram is a rough attempt 
to simplify the division of roles and responsibilities within the governing gada grade.  
 
Figure 7:- A diagram illustrating division of power, responsibilities, and roles within the rank of the 
ruling gada grade, luba. 
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Since the present subsection attempts to provide a brief description of the Oromo polity 
during the 16
th
 century, only some aspects of the Oromo Polity that are believed to be of 
some importance for our thesis have been selected and highlighted. Before concluding our 
overview, therefore, it is important to further highlight some cultural aspects of the Oromo 
polity.  
 
Figure 8: The picture
35
 of the statue of Abba Boku/Biyya with his Scepter, the sign of authority. The 
statue also includes the large sycamore tree, odda, under whose shade gada assemblies have taken place 
for centuries. The statute is found in Adama/Nazareth, the seat of Cafee Oromia which is the parliament 
of the present day Oromia Regional State.        
Although Oromo women were not active participants in the political routine of the gada 
system, as mothers, however, they engaged in various rituals. Among these rituals, were rites 
of passages in which parents provided active support for their male children in passing from 
one generation to the other. Even if there were also other public occasions through which 
Oromo women could contribute to the effectiveness of the gada system, the area in which 
Oromo’s women contribution had been paramount was their role as “time keepers,” to use the 
apt expression by Bulcha.  
The women who have been experts in time keeping were called ayyaantuu. According to 
Bulcha, “there is some literature on the complex methods used by the ayyaantuu, time-
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reckoning experts, to determine the position of the celestial bodies and compute the calander 
year. The calendar is based on astronomical observations of the moon in conjunction with 
seven or eight particular stars or star groups…known as urgi dhaha-guiding stars.”
36
  
There is another cultural feature that also has to be highlighted in the current subsection. It is 
called irreecha. It is an annual feast meant for expressing gratitude towards waqa. It has been 
celebrated every year, days before the New Year, according to Oromo Calendar.
37
 The 
irreecha has played a paramount cohesive role each year in bringing everyone together 
regardless of age and sex for the same goal. The goal has been to be grateful towards waqa. 
Thus through the muda ceremonies/pilgrimage in honor of the qallu/and irreecha, collective 
concerns of Oromo polity had been raised and were given blessings.              
In nutshell, one may conclude that the features of Oromo polity during the 16
th
 century can 
help us to understand Oromo’s collective identity. The gada system, through its various 
socio-cultural and political channels, had brought the whole Oromo polity in a kind of 
cohesive network in which everyone was bound to each other through reciprocally oriented 
roles, responsibilities and rights.  
The muda ceremony, various rituals including those rites of passages during transitions from 
one gada grade to the other, and irreecha had been major cultural features that further 
strengthen the cohesiveness of the Oromo polity. On the basis of the insights that are 
generated from the enemas assimilation process of the ‘alien’ through mogaasaa, it can be 
argued that the Oromo were conscious of their collective Oromo identity vis-à-vis the ‘other’.  
3.2. How can we characterize the collective existence of Oromo polity during 
the 16
th
 century using concepts such as tribe, ethnie, or nation? 
In contrast to the previous subsection of the present chapter, which has been highly 
descriptive of the ethnographic and historical particularities of the Oromo society, the current 
subsection will be rather highly interpretive in its mode of exposition. In so doing, we will 
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focus on some issues related to agency and structural aspects of the Oromo polity in order to 
understand the same polity as a collective entity.  
When we seek to understand the Oromo as a collective entity, concepts such as tribe, ethnie 
and nation will be used as analytical tools so that the discussion in this particular subsection 
will be in harmony with the spirit of the whole thesis. How can one understand a tribe? Tribe 
and its derivatives, the adjective tribal and the noun tribalism, had greater importance and 
appeal among some works, published mainly before the 1960s, that dealt with African socio-
cultural and political organization.   
In those days, tribe had wider appeal among social anthropologists and other alike scholars 
when it came to describe some social features of African societies. Today, anthropology as a 
discipline has already distanced itself from the usage of the term tribe for methodological 
reasons. Why does anthropology make such a methodological shift in the usage of the term 
tribe? This will be the basic issue that will be given greater attention in this subsection. 
Before addressing this crucial point, however, it seems wise to discuss as to why our thesis 
placed the issue of tribe into the focus of the present discussion. 
Tribe and its derivatives have been used in different contexts and to different degree in 
relation to nation and nationalism. For example, some of the sources at our disposal that 
made a great deal of contribution to the historiography of Oromo have relied on the concept 
of tribe to describe the Oromo.
38
 Owing to the fact that the present thesis attempts to 
understand the Oromo using the concept of a nation, it is indispensable to address whether the 
Oromo had been/are tribal societies or not.  
As it will be discussed later, considering the Oromo as a tribe could pose a methodological 
problem to our endeavor of understanding the Oromo from the point view of a nation or vice 
versa. It follows then that the thesis must settle the issue at hand before attempting to validate 
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As for instance, Eric Haberland is one of the few Africanist scholars whose work make a breakthrough in 
the historiography of the Oromo, in particular concerning the debate surrounding ‘Oromo’s country of Origin’. 
Although Professor Haberalnd used the term tribe in a very loose form to describe the Oromo and other societies in 
South Ethiopia, one may still reveal some covert qualitative distinctions in comparison to the Christian half of 
Northern Ethiopia. For the case with the Oromo, cf. Eric Haberland, “The Galla of Southern Ethiopia,” Summarized 
English Translation of his Book, Galla Sud-Athiopiens,( Mimeographed IES Archives, A/68, 1970),  1-17.  For his 
usage of tribe in relation to Societies in Southern Ethiopia, see Haberland, “The Influence of the Christian Ethiopian 
Empire in Southern Ethiopia,” 2
nd
 International Conference of Ethiopian Studies at Manchester (Institute of Ethiopia 
Studies, 1964), 135-38.  




its methodological position that aspires to understand the concept of nation and the Oromo 
polity by using reciprocal movements.   
In what seems to be a response to the dominant discourse on Africa during the 1960s that—
impressed the formation of ‘new nation states’ in the continent—professed a new era for 
Africa, Colin M. Turnbull argues that “in the midst of a series of papers dealing with the 
movement of Africa in world affairs today and with the nature of the role the new African 
nations are to play…before the new nations can be properly understood we have to 
understand tribalism.”
39
 He further insists that tribalism “ is neither a popular nor fashionable 
idea, but the desire to divorce tribalism from the modern, contemporary Africa with which 
we have to deal is both unrealistic and misconceived.”
40
 
As one may infer from some of the information provided in the footnotes, the works cited in 
relation to our discussion of tribe were published between 1960 and 1970. As we will see 
later, the usage of the concepts of tribe and tribalism were widespread before and during 
1960s. It would be a mere judgmental endeavor to point a finger at the scholars of these 
generations simply because the term they used is, from today’s perspective, a culturally 
loaded derogatory concept. It would rather make sense if we try to understand the prevailing 
context in the period in order to grasp how and why these scholars came to use these 
concepts.    
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See Colin M. Turnbull, “Tribalism and Social Evolution in Africa,” The Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science (1964) Since the following paper was published two years before Turbull’s paper, it 
helps to get the context of his argument. The following paper is not only antecedent to Turnbull’s paper, but is also 
written from the opposite perspective. In contrast to Turnbull’s argument, see the negative side of tribalism in William 
R. Bascom, “Tribalism, Nationalism, and Pan-Africanism,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science (January, 1962),22-32         
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According to Turnbull, the misconception regarding tribalism in Africa was as the result of two reasons: 
One, tribalism was misunderstood as antithesis to the role the new nation states had to play in the period, that is, in the 
1960s; two, tribalism was misunderstood as backward phenomenon, the opposite of modernism. On the basis of these 
two positions, therefore, Turnbull goes on to suggest that: “Without wishing for a moment to suggest that tribalism 
can or should be perpetuated, I propose that tribal systems should be carefully re-examined and tribal values 
reconsidered. For him, “such examination will lead us to a greater understanding of what the new nations are, and 
why, but also … there are in tribal systems many values, institutional and personal, that could play a significant role in 
the developing of new political and social systems…” From such perspectives, “Tribal Africa never has been static;” 
Turnbull argues, “on the contrary, it has been vital and dynamic, resilient to a remarkable degree.” According to him, 
“It is unthinkable that such a deep-routed system could have completely disappeared in so few years, however much 
the outer form has changed.” See Turnbull, 23-24     




Although the concepts have always implied, either implicitly or explicitly, a kind of 
qualitative distinction in terms of modern versus primitive, the authors during the decade 
might have intended them as a neutral form of social classification, like family and society, 
seeing it from a common sense perspective. Furthermore, as Eriksen remarks, terms like 
ethnic group and ethnicity attracted the attention of social anthropologists only after the 
1960s, though the term ethnic has been in use since antiquity.
41
 Thus, tribe and tribalism 
might have been understood in the period in part in the same context as what is conveyed by 
the meanings of ethnic entity and ethnicity today.
42
  M. TURNBULL   
In similar vein, Thomas Hylland Eriksen talks about “a shift in Anglophone social 
anthropological terminology concerning the nature of the social units we study. While one 
formerly spoke of ‘tribes,’ the term ‘ethnic group’ is nowadays much more common.”
43
 He 
also argues that the change was not merely the replacement of one term by the other. Rather, 
the change reflects a shift in substance from an understanding of tribe as a static and isolated 
social unit to a more dynamic social unit based on intra/inter-ethnic interaction.  
According to Eriksen, a change from a tribe to an ethnic group “may also mitigate or even 
transcend an ethnocentric or Eurocentric bias which anthropologists have often been accused 
of promoting covertly.”
44
 Eriksen argues that “when we talk of tribes, we implicitly introduce 
a sharp, qualitative distinction between ourselves and the people we study; the distinction 
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Here it must be noted that though the term ethnic has been in use since antiquity, its meaning has shown 
greater dynamics across time. See Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological 
Perspectives, 3
rd
 ed. (New York: Pluto Press, 2010), 4.  
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Erik Haberland, for instance, avoids using tribe in his later publication. Where he needs to conceptualize a 
social unit, he has used ethnic groups in place of tribes. Cf. Haberland, “Ethnogensis and Expansion in Southwest 
Ethiopia with Special reference to the Omotic-Speaking Peoples,” in Abbay: Documents pour Servir a l’Histoire de la 
Civilisation Ethiopienne, ed. Jean Chavaillon, no.9, (France: Center National de la Recherche Scientifique ;C.N.R.S, 
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As far as the current chapter is considered, we are interested in the issue primarily concerning 
the context in which tribe may implicate a sharp, qualitative distinction between the ‘self’ 
and the ‘other.’ Thus let us devote some more passages for this issue and elaborate the point 
that we seek to establish in relation to the word tribe. Why did tribe and tribalism get 
currency in anthropological discourses in the past? To put it otherwise, why did 
anthropologists exploit tribe and tribalism to describe socio-cultural and political 
organizations in Africa and elsewhere before the 1960s?    
Among other things, it seems plausible that anthropology had been highly influenced by its 
‘fore-tradition’ and its respective ‘particular present’ when adopting a sharp qualitative 
distinction between itself and its ‘objects,’ the ‘uncivilized and primitive’ societies in Africa 
and elsewhere.
46
 So why did anthropology conceptualize its “object” as a tribe?  
This directly takes us to the issue of ‘alterity’ which is “the concept and treatment of the alien 
objectified other.”
47
 According to Rapport and Overing, the concept of ‘alterity’ has been 
gaining ground in the vocabularies of anthropology since the 1990s only because 
anthropology during this period underwent a process of reflexive engagement with its 
otherwise shaky epistemological foundation.
48
 
Before anthropology engaged itself critically with the process of self-reflection, tribe as a 
concept played a significant role in the larger dichotomy of civilized or modern Europe/West 
vis-à-vis the primitive “others” in Africa and elsewhere. “By definition anthropology’s 
primary object for study has been the Western imperialized other,” Rapport and Overing 
argue, “(while sociology has had the task of objectifying the West’s own internal subaltern 
classes).”
49
 This was so, claim Rapport and Overing, because “anthropology had its birth as 
an academic discipline in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, during what we might label the 
height of modernist thought—and at the apex of Western imperialist endeavors.”
50
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According to them, anthropology was thus seriously under the influence of its immediate 
intellectual and political-economic milieu. Anthropology using its ‘realistic rhetoric,’ which 
was the influence both from its modernist epistemological ground and the prevailing colonial 
state’s discourses, reduced societies in Africa and elsewhere as its objects to be “naturalized 
and thereby belong to one of those worlds transcended by modern civilization to be marked 
as an uncivilized of nature…To objectify is to naturalize, and therefore to create distance 
between self and the object, whether it to be animate or inanimate, human or stone.”
51
  
Rapport and Overing argue that two strategies had been very instrumental in the process of 
objectifying the uncivilized and primitive other. According to them, “western creations of 
difference and images of otherness are products of a process of exclusion. The exclusivist 
ideology, which assumes the superiority of self-vis-à-vis all others, is a very good strategy 
through which to disempower others.”
52
  
And through the principle of inversion, socio-cultural variations and other aspects of 
difference “…between self and other was understood to be absolute.”
53
 As a result, the 
primitive other with its tribal socio-cultural organizations, its tribal chiefs, and its tribal 
customary laws were thus taken as an absolute inversion of modern Europe with its modern 
nation-states, rational society, written law and so on and so forth.
54
   
If the importance of culturally loaded words like tribes have expired and the words are not in 
use any more even within contemporary anthropological discourses, then it seems plausible at 
this level that it is not methodologically appropriate or safe any longer to describe the Oromo 
mode of existence in the past as being tribal in kind. But this does not mean that tribe and 
tribalism have already ceased to be used in today’s scholarly publications. Even though we 












By using the following points from Rapport and Joanna Overing, the above argument can be justified in the 
following way: “Such ‘inferiorization’ of excluded others became a constant throughout the development of European 
thought. It developed by the 19
th
 century into unifying discourse upon alterity that was structured further by the 
increasingly popular language of evolutionism. With its stress upon the progressive move of humankind from the 





have a handful of literature at our disposal, still one can see the persistence and appeal of 
these concepts in some recently published works.
55
     
If it is not methodologically tenable to consider Oromo society in terms of a tribe or 
tribalism, could we use the concepts of ethnie or nation instead? Since the concept of a nation 
has been the focus of the previous chapter and will be so in the following one as well, we will 
refrain from getting too deep into discussing the issue of a nation in the current chapter.  
Some definitions concerning nation will suffice to highlight whether we can understand the 
Oromo as a nation or not as a detailed discussion along this point will be made in the 
subsequent chapter. In contrast, we must carry out here a brief theoretical overview on the 
concepts of ethnic entity and ethnicity in order to maintain for our thesis a frame of 
understanding that will be helpful while we seek to understand the Oromo polity in relation to 
such conceptual apparatus.   
Just like nation and nationalism, concepts such as ethnic entities and ethnicity are equally 
ambiguous and controversial.
56
 According to Ronald Cohen, these concepts have such vague 
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Unfortunately, very recent publications in relation to nation, ethnic federalism and in the field of education 
have made use of tribalism in one way or another, although we are not sure whether these authors have a clear idea 
about the ideological implications of the terms or not. A recent book focusing on ‘Nation’ has used tribe as one level 
of social development that leads to another levels of developments, ethnic entities and then to statehood. According to 
this work, “Tribal societies were mostly pre- or protohistoric, that is, they lacked writing systems. Good evidence 
about them comes only from historic state societies, pre-modern or modern, that left records of their tribal 
neighbors.”Cf. Azar Gat, Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 44-66. Using such definitional framework, the Oromo during the 
16
th
 century had been tribal societies only because they lacked a written culture. As it has been mentioned elsewhere 
before, the present thesis does not accept such rationalization for using a tribe either as a social unit or as a marker of 
a stage of social development. In the field of education, a work published in 2012 has used tribalism as one polarity in 
a given continuum that also comprises globalization on the other end of the same continuum. In their extreme context, 
both tribalism and globalization are seen as dangerous. Thus, an equilibrium between these two forces has to be 
maintained that can only be feasible when the two forces co-exist together. Cf. Sameena Karim, “The Co-existence of 
Globalism and Tribalism: A Review of Literature,” Journal of Research in International Education11, no.2 (2012), 
137-151.  A recent publication on Ethiopian ethnic federalism has also used tribalism to devalue the present 
statuesque of Ethiopian state that is an umbrella of ethnic based federations. Had it not been for scope and other 
constraints, it would have been interesting to discuss whether such pretentions are valid or not. It suffices here to raise 
our doubt whether there was a comprehensive and all inclusive ‘collective Ethiopian identity’ across time or not. It 
would have been interesting also to debate as to how any attempt to understand and thus represent various social 
groups in Ethiopia in terms of an ethnic entity or a nation would end up as mere enterprise of tribalism. Also, in light 
of self-determination, it does not seem to me valid to reduce national self-determination in its totality as a mere a 
tribal enterprise. To have a better grasp as to how the work under discussion has used tribalism and to see from which 
angle I have been arguing, see Assefa Mehretu, “Ethnic Federalism and its Potential to dismember the Ethiopian 
State,” Progress in Development Studies12, no. 2 & 3 (2012), 113-133.      
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It is a paradox, however, that the debate concerning ethnicity also assumes additional dimensions when it 
comes to its application to the African situation. There are a number of works that consider ethnicity as a legacy of 
colonialism. If nation, nationalism, and ethnicity are all but mere legacies of European colonialism, then how can we 




meanings because they “involve a variety of forms, scope, intensity; and having psychic, 
historical, social, economic and political variables.”
57
 Although the terms ethnic entity and 
ethnicity are sometimes seen as being synonymous and hence used interchangeably, the 
current thesis considers them nevertheless as separate but interrelated concepts.  
Thus we may consider nationalism as some kind of sentimental feeling be it instrumental or 
otherwise; we may then see a nation as a social unit that nationalist’s want to use as a source 
of legitimacy or what they want to build if the nation does not exist yet. Following this 
example, we may draw a parallel between such terms as ethnic entities or nation on one hand, 
and ethnicity or nationalism, on the other. As nation and nationalism are two different but 
interrelated phenomena, so are ethnies and ethnicity. As the degree and nature of dependence 
of nationalism on nation or otherwise is a point of argument among scholars in the field, 
neither is the context of ethnicity’s dependence on ethnie a matter of consensus.
58
  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
fall into a methodological trap as far Ethiopia is considered. If indeed, such phenomena were indeed colonial legacies, 
does this mean that neither ethnicity and nor nationalism has ever been part of socio-cultural and political realities in 
Ethiopia across time and space? I remember reading a paper entitled, “Is Ethnicity a Colonial Legacy in Africa?” 
when I was doing my MA at Addis Ababa University. The paper has inverted the interrogative format of its title into a 
statement and concluded that ethnicity is indeed a colonial legacy in Africa. Unfortunately, I cannot get an access to 
this paper this time so that I cannot cite it here. Yet, the following paper, in which the author attempts to show 
ethnicity as a process of historical construction ranging from the pre-colonial times to the post-colonial Africa, 
hopefully highlights the nature of the debate in Africa. The paper uses patron-client relations across time in Africa as 
its empirical resource to justify its position vis-à-vis those discourses that depict ethnicity as a mere ‘colonial 
construction’ as far as Africa is considered. See Bruce J. Berman, “Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State: The 
Politics of Uncivil Nationalism,” African Affairs 97(1998), 305-341.  
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As quoted in Sisay Megersa, Amhara-Oromo Ethnic Interaction, 12. 
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As for instance, one may find some works which consider such contingency of ethnicity upon the presence 
of ethnic entities as a mere ethnic group’s reifications. It can be argued that Brubaker’s ‘group reification’ argument 
seems very potent against the primordial conception of ethnicity that downplays individual’s interest and 
decision/agency. Cf. Rogers Brubaker, ed., “Ethnicity without Groups,” Ethnicity without Groups (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2004), 7-27.  As for instance, Clifford Geertz, who is one among prominent primordial 
thinkers, argues that “One is bound to one’s kinsman, one’s neighbor, one’s fellow believer, ipso facto; as the result 
not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part 
by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself [emphasis mine].” Yet, Geertz himself 
also acknowledges some level of individual agency and flux when he insists that “the general strength of such 
primordial bonds, and the types of them that are important, differ from person to person, from society to society, and 
from time to time.” Cf. Clifford Geertz, “Primordial Ties,” in Ethnicity: Oxford Readers, ed. John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 42; 40-45. On the contrary, as to how individual agency 
is magnified vis-à-vis primordial conceptions, see Michael Hechter, “Ethnicity and Rational Choice Theory,” in 
Ethnicity: Oxford Readers, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 90-
98.  Compare also, Sisay Megersa, Amhara-Oromo Ethnic Interaction,11-16.  A third alternative, providing a 
situational perspective but not necessarily an instrumental/functional one (like in the case of some of the previous 
authors, such as Michael Hechter), can be found in Eghosa E. Osaghae, “A Re-examination of the Conception of 
Ethnicity in Africa as an Ideology of Inter-elite competition,” African Study Monographs 12, no. 1(1991),43-61. 
According to this work, there are situations in which ethnicity is used as an elite maneuver; but there are also times 




It seems apparent that the root words, ethnic and ethnicity, have originated from a Greek 
word, ethnos, which seems to connote “…a range of situations in which a collectivity of 
humans lived and acted together…and which is typically translated today as ‘people’ or 
‘nation’.”
59
 While the term ethno merely denotes a sense of people for Y.V. Bromley, Walker 
Connor claims that ethno is “the Greek word for nation in the latter’s pristine sense of a 
group characterized by common descent.”
60
John Hutchison and Anthony D. Smith claim that 
“the term ‘ethnicity’ is quite clearly, a derivative of the much older term and more commonly 
used adjective ‘ethnic’…The English adjective ‘ethnic’ in turn derives from the ancient 




Due to the fact, as Hutchison and Smith further note, “that the English language has no 
equivalent proper noun for the Greek ethnos—unlike French, which retains the noun ethnie,” 
the difficulty of the concepts of ethnicity and ethnic entities also extended to the etymology 
of these two terms to some extent.
62
 After showing the problematic nature of the etymology 
of the terms of ethnie, ethnic and ethnicity, Hutchison and Smith suggest to use only the 
French term ethnie to denote ‘ethnic communities’ or ‘ethnic groups.’
63
 We also follow the 
example of Hutchison and Smith and we stick to ethnie whenever we want to mention either 
an ‘ethnic entity’ or ‘ethnic groups’ for the sake of simplicity and economy of words.  
Leaving aside the debates and controversies concerning ethnie in the field of ethnicity lets us 
depart from Fredrick Barth’s understanding of an ethnie. For him, “…ethnic groups are 
categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus have the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the elites taking some political-economic considerations, or take place at cultural level of the masses, ethnicity 
altogether is considered as contingent on the existence of ethnic groups.   
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characteristics of organizing interaction between people.”
64
 Barth himself departs from an 
ideal type that seems to reconcile the objectivists and subjectivists of understanding of an 
ethnie.
65
 In conformity with objectivists, Barth’s ideal type defines an ethnie as a 
“biologically self-perpetuating” group that “shares fundamental cultural values, realized in 




On the other hand, Barth’s ideal type also gives an emphasis to the subjective aspect of an 
ethnie, that is, “the characteristic of self-ascription and ascription by others.”
67
Barth argues 
that the characteristic of ascription is an important feature of an ethnie. Barth insists that 
defining an ethnie as an ascriptive and exclusive group helps to understand the nature of 
continuity within such social units. Although the social and cultural content of any ethnie 
tend to be malleable due to historical dynamics, the persistence of collective identity through 
the maintenance of group’s boundary vis-à-vis the other enables the ethnie to have the 
possibility of continuity across time.
68
      
Leaning on Fredrick Barth, ethno-symbolism—as a third alternative in the study of nation 
and nationalism— has brought ethnie and ethnicity to the center of analysis.
69
 Since we will 
discuss this at length in relation to some aspects of ethno-symbolism in the subsequent 
chapter, at this point it suffices to take ideal types of an ethnie and a nation from Smith and 
use them to understand the Oromo in relation to these two conceptual apparatus. According 
to Smith, an ethnie can be defined ideally as:  
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Merging the objectivist and subjectivist traits, Eghosa E. Osaghae provides a composite definitional 
framework that is helpful to understand an ethnic entity from both perspectives. Osaghae defines an ethnic group as 
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‘a named and self-defined human community whose members possess a myth of common 
ancestry, shared memories, one or more elements of common culture, including a link with a 
territory, and a measure of solidarity, at least among the upper strata’.
70
 
If we decompose the definition into its pieces, we can distinguish objective and subjective 
aspects of an ethnie. From the objective point of view, we may consider the following 
characteristics: ‘myth of common ancestry,’ ‘shared memories,’ ‘one or more elements of 
common culture,’ ‘link with territory.’ As one may recall from our earlier descriptive 
discussion of the Oromo during the 16
th
 century, they regarded themselves as children of 
Orma. They spoke a common language, afaan Oromo. They worshiped the same supreme 
divine entity, waqa. They believed to belong to a scared mythical homeland, Mada Walaabu. 
They had common/shared historical memories, sena Oromo/history of Oromo.
71
  
When it comes to subjective traits, we may focus on two such traits presented in Smith’s 
ideal type. On the one hand, we may consider the Oromo polity as ‘a named and self-defined 
human community.’ Though we may rely on some of the objective traits like the mythical 
common fatherhood as a point of reference to show the Oromo self-awareness about their 
collective entity, Orommumma would serve us better to make our point clear. Since it has 
already been discussed what Orommumma constitute, we will not discuss once again here 
what Orommumma means. Rather, we wish to use it in combination with another important 
aspect of Oromo culture, mogaasaa.  
These two aspects of Oromo society give us an insight into Oromo’s self-awareness of its 
collective socio-cultural boundary. Because once a nearby group had been assimilated 
through mogaasaa, the assimilation process occurred, which involved mutual recognition of 





Shared memories of the Oromo past had been preserved in two ways. First, there were some peoples within 
the gada rank whose main duty was to preserve the Oromo past orally. Here one would doubt the effectiveness of 
such mechanism of preserving the collective past, especially if the locus of observation is a written culture. It is 
evident that every details of the past could not be preserved using the individuals’ memory. It seems inevitable that the 
past had been preserved in a very selective way. Though the degree varies, selectivity of the past is also something 
one cannot avoid even concerning a written record of the past. In every cafe conventions, laws were revised and had 
been incorporated into sera (custom/law) of Oromo. Since past experiences and customs had to be consulted before 
the new laws were promulgated, sena Oromo had served as a frame of reference into the past. From this perspective, 
we may assume that when part of the Oromo past had been preserved using the personal memories of the persons 
entrusted for this kind of particular task, it seems plausible that utmost emphases might had been given for those 
issues that were considered to be common interest of the Oromo polity. The Oromo also used an additional 
mechanism to make sure that part of the Oromo past would be passed down from generation to generation. For this 
purpose, Oromo elders who had already been retired from any public life of the Polity were responsible to look after 
their respective grandchildren. In so doing, they had been instrumental in passing “the framework of collective 




both groups. While the assimilated group had to be willing to be totally absorbed into the 
Oromo society, which also involved the renaming of the new group by using one of the 
names of the Oromo sub-divisions, the Oromo society in turn had to provide equal socio-
economic and political rights for the assimilated group.  
Using Barth arguments, we can thus infer two basic points here: First, the cultural and social 
content of Oromo polity had been so much in flux that it would be a mere essentialist creed if 
one claimed that there is any essential component to Oromo identity. Instead of the 
essentiality of the substantial part of Oromo identity which has been in continuous flux, the 
maintenance and persistence of the markers— meaning the form vis-à-vis the content—of 
Oromo identity such as afaan Oromo has enabled the Oromo society to remain as an Oromo 
collective entity across times. Second, and most importantly, these two aspects are also very 
important to establish the fact that the Oromo had been self-aware of their collective identity 
at least during the 16
th
 century. 
On the other hand, we may also describe Oromo’s collective awareness subjectively by using 
Smith’s last characteristics of an ethnie, namely ‘a measure of solidarity, at least among the 
upper strata.’ It seems plausible that Smith wants to indicate some level of consciousness or 
awareness among the members of an ethnie, according to which the ethnie can be seen as the 
totality of its individual members.  
Yet, Smith has also inserted the phrase in relation to solidarity, ‘at least among the elites’, 
only because he might have been constrained by European historicity that discourage the 
assumption of solidarity as a mass phenomenon concerning an enthie or a nation during pre-
modern Europe. This point relating to European history will be discussed at length in the 
following chapter.  
As far as our case is concerned, however, the Oromo polity had been neither vertically nor 
horizontally stratified from a political-economic perspective.
72
 Since the Oromo polity in the 
period was an ‘egalitarian’ society in relative terms, the dichotomy of elite versus masses is 
not helpful to understand the Oromo polity. While the political life was both the duty and 
right of any adult man, public life was both the duty and right for anyone regardless of age 
and sex.  
                                                          
72




Everyone participated in the public life according to the roles structurally assigned to them 
and did so also as an agent. On the basis of such analytic observations, it can be then argued 
that individual members of the Oromo society engaged in reciprocal recognition of each other 
via their mutual participation in the public life of the Oromo polity according to the various 
ranks of the ‘gada system.’
73
  
On the basis of structural fabrics such as the gada system and active participations of agents 
in such structures and in numerous and recurrent ritual ceremonies; one may conclude that 
the Oromo polity in the period had a greater degree of solidarity among its individual 
members. Using Smith’s ideal type for an ethnie, one may thus clearly see his ideal type 
neatly fitting to the empirical reality of the Oromo polity during the 16
th
 century.  
Yet, by using such knit-and fit strategy, one may also see that the Oromo polity during the 
same period neatly fits Smith’s ideal type of a nation, as well. According to Smith, a nation 
can be ideally defined as: 
‘a named and self-defining human community whose members cultivate shared memories, 
symbols, myths, traditions and values, inhabit and are attached to historic territories or 




As one may notice from the above ideal type, most of the traits that are listed as 
characteristics of a nation are also applicable to an ethnie, though one may notice that the 
substances of the common traits are phrased differently. Since they are clear and self-evident, 
we do not want to waste our time here discussing those features that are shared by the ideal 
nation and ethnie. Yet, it is important to point out here that such common features can be 
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instrumental in highlighting that the conceptual boundaries of an ethnie and a nation 
significantly overlap and are not that much different from each other. 
 
It seems plausible that the following two traits of a nation are the only ones that are missing 
from the ideal type of an ethnie: ‘create and disseminate a distinctive public culture;’ and 
‘standardized laws.’ As far as the first one is considered, it seems more crucial for a nation, 
unlike an ethnie, only if there is a presumption that a nation is a logical outgrowth of a 
society that has been previously stratified or diversified along various social, economic, or 
political lines.  
 
These lines could be classes, status units, or any parochial units that inhibit the society from 
attaining some level of homogeneity. Since a nation is presumed to have some level of 
homogeneity that transcends socio-cultural, economic and political lines of divisions, creation 
or dissemination of a public culture is important to understand a nation in terms of national 
consciousness, which in return is an indication of homogeneity within a nation though this 
might sound a circular argument.  
 
Keeping the Oromo polity in mind, one may argue that the overall gada system with its 
numerous kinds of ritual ceremonies could be considered as manifestation of a public 
culture.
75
 On the other hand, however, if the presumption behind the need for a public culture 
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emerged after 1945,” and “European rituals such as the dismantling of border barriers by young Europeans” are taken 
as indication of “Emerging European public sphere,” as argued by Harmut Kaelble. Cf. “The European Public 
Sphere,” a lecture presented at Max Weber Lecture Series: MWP-LS 2007/09(2007), 2-11. To understand the ‘public 
sphere’ from a different context, see Harold Mah, “Phantasies of the Public Sphere: Rethinking the Habermas of 
Historians,” in Special Issue in Honor of Francois Furet: Journal of Modern History; Chicago Journals 72, no. 1( 




is to justify the level of solidarity and level of homogeneity among members of a nation, do 
we then need this particular trait to justify whether the Oromo were a nation or otherwise?  
 
Since the Oromo society during the 16
th
 century were not stratified along political-economic 
lines, the creation of a public culture as means to form a relatively homogenous social entity 
from a previously heterogonous society would rather be less crucial in analyzing the features 
of Oromo polity in that period. The next chapter will attempt to show how the creation of a 
public culture might be more helpful in understanding a nation in the European context than 
from the perspective of the Oromo. 
 
With regard to the second trait that we have mentioned, it is questionable whether it can be 
applicable to the Oromo context or not. When we consider how the adoption of the Roman 
law during early modern times in Europe harmonized jurisprudence within a particular 
jurisdiction of the rising absolutist state, we may understand ‘standardized laws’ in contrast to 
the earlier numerous local laws in force when feudalism was the order of the day. 
 
It follows then that if ‘standardized laws’ in the context of common law (universal law vis-à-
vis the previous numerous local laws in a given jurisdiction of a state) can be attributed to 
European Absolutist State for its adoption of the Roman Law during early modern times in 




 centuries), by simple analogy of common law we may say 
that ‘standardized laws’ is also applicable to the Oromo polity during the 16
th
 century. 
Nevertheless, once we go beyond such simple analogy and the moment ‘standardized laws’ 
tends to have other dimensions beyond the context we have used here, then the application of 
‘standardized laws’ to the Oromo context would rather sound shaky.    
 
It has to be noted that our effort needs not to be seen as mere knit-and fit activity and 
consequently as obsessed with proving at any expense that the Oromo polity can be described 
as a nation. Although unfortunately it might seem so, this has not been our intention. The 
basic point we want to accomplish within the current subsection is to show the possibility that 
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one might understand the Oromo both as an ethnie and a nation. As far as the ideal types are 
taken as points of references, it has been demonstrated that the two concepts, ethnie and 
nation, overlap each other at least at the level of definition. Using the history of Oromo as a 
case, we have attempted to highlight how the conceptual and empirical boundary between an 
ethnie and a nation is highly fuzzy and blurred.  
 
Instead of answering at this level the question whether the Oromo case can be best 
understood via the concept of a nation or an ethnie, we would like to conclude our chapter 
with a question. Does it seem plausible that the Oromo polity during the 16
th
 century could be 
understood by these two concepts simultaneously? To contextualize the question in such a 
way so that our suggestion may highlight the possibility of a third alternative in the 
understating of nation vis-à-vis an ethnie, we will put the question differently in the following 
manner:     
(1) Contrary to the modernist’s argument that consider an ethnie and a nation as two discrete 
phenomena; or  
(2) being in difference to the ethno-symbolic understanding of the two phenomena as two 
connected stages of transformation of a society in which the persistence of ethnic relations 
serves as the foundation for the process of nation formation; then 
(3) does it make sense if one understand the concepts of ethnie and nation as two different 





Understanding Nation using a European Discursive Unit 
When it is claimed that nation is the product of the modern world, then such claim—be it in a 
form of theoretical abstraction or empirically infused generalization—has to be tested for its 
validity. Having this in mind, it is then also evident that such conceptual claim has to gain its 
validity from the socio-historical context it purports to represent. Thus the main task of the 
present chapter is to understand the modernist claim that considers nation as the product of 
the modern era. To what extent is the modernist orthodoxy that confines the existence of a 
nation to the modern period valid? After all, when the present thesis attempts to understand 
the Oromo society of the 16
th
 century as a nation, such a methodological stance brings the 
thesis into clear conflict with the existing universal axioms of a nation.   
It has to be noted here that the present thesis is neither the first nor the only work that raises 
the question of validity concerning the exclusively modern presence of the nation. Adrian 
Hasting’s seminal work, for instance, is important in this respect. Hasting has tried to 
challenge the modernists view concerning the nation by using a socio-historical examples 
from within and outside Europe. By citing some works by Anthony Smith and John 
Hutchison, Hasting also claims that he is “not alone in disagreeing.”
1
 
Given the formidable epistemological claims made by modernists, any work that attempts to 
understand a nation outside the modernists’ tradition first has to reckon with the modernists’ 
view of the nation. Though the current thesis, similarly to Hasting’s work, raises some 
concerns of validity concerning the modernists’ view of the nation, the particular socio-
historical contexts that are used by the works to empirically test modernist assumptions are 
completely different. Neither the nature of the arguments nor the methodological arsenals are 
similar.   
The current thesis is greatly defined by the methodological considerations discussed in one of 
the previous chapters. The thesis has to strictly adhere to its methodological premise of 
achieving hermeneutic understanding through hermeneutic practice. Thus the current chapter 
will not engage in any kind of theoretical or methodological criticism of the modernists’      
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epistemology and by-extension of other theoretical schools that understand the nation as an 
upshot of modernism. Rather, our effort will be channeled towards understanding the social 
and historical milieu that is at the backdrop of the modernists’ view of the nation as the 
product of the modern era.  
In addition to our effort to understand the particular European socio-historical context that is 
at the backdrop of modernist arguments, some kind of comparative analogy with the Oromo 
case will also be attempted. If we can identify some level of congruency between the two 
specificities, then the generalization and abstraction that are produced by using the European 
case will also be applicable by implication to the Oromo context.  
If there is, however, a discrepancy between these two different socio-historical contexts, then 
the generalizations generated out of a European specificity will only be applicable to 
European empirical context. Consequently, such generalization will hardly be applicable to 
the empirical context that is specific to the Oromo. In short, if we can find a discrepancy 
between the two specificities, the validity of one of the universal axioms of modernist school 
that embedded the origin of the nation in the European spatial and temporal context will be at 
stake.  
Remaining strictly within the confines of hermeneutic practice we will, therefore, structure 
our overall discussion in the current section in a question and answer format as a way of 
ultimately addressing our desired objective. Before we proceed with our task, it is important 
to consider the arguments Gadamer makes in respect to “The logic of Question and Answer.” 
According to him, “hermeneutic phenomenon too implies the primacy of dialogue and 
structure of question and answer.”
2
 In his view, “a historical text is made the object of 
interpretation means that it puts a question to the interpreter…To understand a text means to 
understand this question. Thus a person who wants to understand must question what lies 
behind what is said.”
3
  
Throughout the current chapter, we will have a series of questions that will help us to 
understand from a close range the truth value of the modernists view about the nation. Thus 
our focus will be on understanding: How is the nation understood as the legacy of the modern 
                                                          
2







world? Why is the nation understood as being non-existent before the modern era? What 
factors have constrained scholars in the field to think that there is no logical foundation for a 
nation to exist in the pre-modern era? To what extent are the socio-historical specificities at 
the backdrop of the concept of the nation universally valid and, by implication, also 
consistent with the empirical reality of the Oromo people during the 16
th
 century?    
In compliance with the hermeneutic understanding, we will try thus to understand how nation 
is understood as a product of the modern era by analyzing the views some prominent authors 
articulate concerning the nation. How do we aim to achieve understanding of a nation by 
using the views of some prominent authors? This can only be achieved by understanding the 
socio-historical context from which the authors formulated their theory. To put it differently, 
we seek to understand ‘the particular present’ of a given author through reading the socio-
cultural and historical specificity that is at the backdrop of his/her view of the nation. Before 
doing this, however, it is important to address some basic issues concerning the etymology of 
the word nation.           
To what extent does the etymology of the word nation enhance the endeavor 
that seeks to understand a nation as a concept? 
In order to properly grasp the aforementioned question, we have to rely on Koselleck’s 
history of concept and apply his synchronic and diachronic mode of analysis to the 
etymology of a nation. Quite significant number of the literature at our disposal share the 
view that the word “Nation” was first used by the Romans, although there is disagreement 
among our sources concerning the particular context of the term’s contemporary use.  
According to Walker Connor, “the word nation comes from the Latin and, when first coined, 
clearly conveyed the idea of common blood ties. It was derived from the past participle of the 
verb nasci, meaning to be born. And hence the Latin noun, nationem, connoting breed or 
race.”
4
 In the view of Guido Zernatoo, who has conducted a thorough study on the history of 
the word nation itself, “the Latin word nation has the same stem as the word natus. Both have 
their origin in the word nascor, I am born, whose perfect form is natus sum, I have been born. 
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A natio was therefore to the Romans something born.”
5
 Although Conor is silent on the issue 
concerning whom the term referred to, both Guido and Aira Kemilainen indicates that the 
word ‘nation’ was applied on outsiders, rather than the Roman themselves. Kemilainen notes 
that the word nation “had different meanings in ancient Rome. It meant a foreign tribe or 
people as well as race, a kind, a class.”
6
 Guido confirms this claim when he strongly argues 
that “the Romans never designate themselves as a nation.”
7
 He even goes to the extent to 
claim that the term had a derogatory connotation in the period, citing a speech from Cicero in 
support. According to Guido: 
The nation was a native community of foreigners. Cicero once speaks…of the Jews and the 
Syrians as nationes natae servituti, that is, of people born to servitude. From the previous 
examples and this last application it may clearly be concluded that the original concept of the 
word possessed a derogatory connotation. A nation was a number of foreign people, who 
were bound together by similarity of origin; but it was no superior origin. It was people who 
somehow stood outside, if not indeed below the stratum of Roman society, foreigners.
8
   
The literature  at our disposal confirm that during the Middle Ages the students at the 
University of Paris had been organized into four associations that functioned as unions and 
were called nations. The four nations with their respective titles, notes Guido, were 
“l’honorable nation de France, la fidèle nation de Picardie, la vénérable nation de 
Normandie and la constante nation de Germanie.”
9
 The question, when looking at these 
names, is of course whether such designations coincided with the place/country from where 
these students originally came or not.  
According to Max Weber, such unions did not correspond to nationality or place of origin in 
the modern sense, apart from the usage of “the name nation as a legal concept for an 
organized community.”
10
 Guido’s opinion on this point seems in agreement with Weber. 
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Guido argues that “the nation de France comprised all students who spoke the Romance 
languages…The Picard nation was set aside for the Dutch, the Norman for people of the 
North-east [France], the Germanic for the students from England and Germany.”
11
  
Alhough Hugh Seton Watson has not explicitly stated that there is congruence between the 
country of origin and those student’s unions, he seems to be caught up in the middle 
regarding the issue when he says that “many medieval universities attracted many students 
from other lands besides their own. These were placed in nationes, named after the territories 




We find Conor’s position on this particular issue ambiguous. On the one hand, he seems to 
feel uneasy about the ‘inappropriate’ usage of the term in the period.
13
 On another occasion, 
he provides a rather different definition that is closer to the present meaning of a nation; “a 
blood–related group.”
14
 Despite the presence of such diverse interpretations, one can still 
capture the dynamic aspect of the word nation. It appears that the word has gradually 
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Connor here argues that the term “when introduced into the English language in the late 13
th
 c, it [nation] 
was with its primary connotation of the blood-related group.” Cf. Connor, “A Nation is a Nation,”38. Since Connor 
has come up with a view very different from the rest of our sources, we find it wise to retrace his source and see the 
usage. We have presented what we have found from Connor’s sources as follow as: “Nation (from fw nation, F, 
nationem, L-breed, race) has been in common use in English from 1 C13 originally with primary sense of racial group 
rather than a politically organized grouping. Since there is obvious overlap between these senses, it is not easy to date 
the emergence of the predominant modern sense of a political formation…There was from eC17 a use of the nation 
to mean the whole people of a country, often in contrast, as still in political argument, with some group within it.” All 
emphasis in this quoted passage are by the author himself. Cf. Raymond Williams, “Nationalis” Key Words: A 
vocabulary of Culture and Society(New York: Oxford University, 1976),213-214       
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Concerning the term’s evolution, Guido convincingly shows that term was gradually 
appropriated by the aristocratic class in France in a way so as to refer to a status group vis-à-
vis the masses. As an example, Guido quotes Joseph de Maistre(1753-1821) who is believed 
to inquire “What is a nation?” and also to reply that “it is the sovereign and the aristocracy.”
16
  
Although the term had begun to be loosely associated in France with the aristocratic circle in 
early as 1308, it total appropriation by the aristocratic class only occurred at the eve of the 
French Revolution. It seems plausible that in the wake of the French Revolution and during 
the ensuing age of Liberalism, the aristocratic elite’s monopoly over the word ‘nation’ came 





 century onwards, the term eventually became therefore, a “word of fashion,”
18
 
borrowing the phrase by Guido. Yet, as we have indicated earlier, the term remains to be the 
subject of diverse interpretations and understandings from the very moment it has been 
formulated as a concept. Cases in point are Fitche’s and Renan’s opposing ways of 
formulating the idea of the nation. To further elucidate this point, let us borrow some lines 
from both Kemilainen and Guido, before summing up our discussion about the etymology of 
the nation.  
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Here Guido informs us that the term was first used in reference of “Three groups of aristocrats 
(estates)…the bishops…the nobility and the third estate…Thus there arose country or provincial estates which were 
also designated by the term ‘nation’.” Taking a quoting from, Guido attempts to indicate how Montesquieu’s speech 
were misquoted and given unintended meanings. In way to address the errors made while quoting Montesquieu’s 
speech, Guido forwards his opinion as: “(Under the first two dynasties [of France] the nation was often assembled, 
that is the nobility and the bishops. The common people were not taken into consideration.) This means nothing more 
than that at the time of Montesquieu the word nation, which had passed into the French tongue, was understood in the 








According to Kemilainen, “in the 18
th
 century the word ‘nation’ became in England and 
France almost analogous with ‘state,’ while in Germany it usually preserved the same 
meaning as the ‘nation,’ i.e., ethnical group, in ancient Rome.”
19
 Guido, citing from one of 
his sources, strongly argues that:  
“It is to be noted that the words nation and state have never been used as much as they are 
today” wrote d’Argenson in the year 1754; “Under Louis XIV the two words were never 
spoken, and one did not have so much as an idea of them.” That is understandably. Under 
Louis XIV, king and state were one. Whoever meant “state,” said “king,” and whoever meant 
“king” said “state.” The “nation,” the sum total of the elite, played no role. It was not the 
state.
20
    
It has been attempted so far to highlight at least three basic points: Firstly, the original 
meaning of the word nation seems, when viewed from a synchronic plane, to have been used 
by the Romans to describe the “other,” so much so that the Romans would have considered 
applying the name to themselves as something inappropriate. The Roman case is very 
interesting because it shows that for the period’s hegemonic acting agency, the term had 
basically no real appeal. It would be of course interesting to know the reaction of those 
peoples that were designated by the Romans as natio.   
Secondly, by using the diachronic plane of analysis, we have seen how the word ‘nation’ had 
been gradually appropriated over time by various groups until it became a fashion word from 
the 18
th
 century on. Thirdly and most importantly, we have seen that the word assumed its 
present sense only after the modern period. Even in respect of its modern meaning, as it has 
been discussed elsewhere, nation has been highly debated ever since Fitche and Renan have 
conceptualized the nation using their respective ‘particular present.’ 
It has been confirmed that the term nation was given its present sense only after the advent of 
the modern era. Where does this take us? Does this strengthen the modernist claim that 
nations did not exist before the modern era? On the surface, the discussion presented so far 
would seem to sustain the modernist argument concerning the nation. To put it otherwise, had 
the conceptual representation of the phenomenon of a nation been congruent with what the 









etymology of the term tells us, we could have concluded that nation has indeed no presence 
in the pre-modern era.  
The problem is, however, nation as a normative universal logo tends to transcend the spatial 
and temporal limits imposed upon it by modernists and other alike. Such tendency to surpass 
the spatial and temporal limits imposed upon it by modernists, the dual aspect of a nation, the 
phenomenon and its multidimensional conceptual appearances, has prompted many research 
endeavors to test whether nation is truly a mere a posterior of the modern era, as it has been 
claimed by modernists, or it rather stretches retrospectively into the pre-modern era using its 
conceptual coordinates as a springing board.  
World history, which is described by Gadamer as ‘a great dark book,’ is the only supreme 
authority that can settle the question whether the nation is a mere logical outcome of the 
modern era or it existed prior to that. As indicated elsewhere, scholars like Hasting have tried 
to see the application of the present understanding of a nation to the pre-modern era of 
Europe, using England as a prototype.  
In contrast, the current thesis is trying to see the application of the concept of nation, as it is 
understood in its present meaning, to the same pre-modern era but to a historical singularity 
outside Europe. The two works share one thing in common; they use world history in the 
context of dialectics between the part and the whole. While Hasting focuses on reexamining 
the historical past that of England in particular, the current thesis attempts to make use of a 
peripheral section of world history, the Oromo during the 16
th
 century. 
Nation in its present sense takes into consideration the amorphous definition that sees nation 
as a community of people sharing some or almost all of the following traits: common 
territory, common political territory, common state, shared culture, shared historical 
experience, common language, and common religion and, among others.  
As it has been already mentioned, the current understating of the nation is so amorphous that 
any ideal type or working definition that has been so far generated as a result of combination 
of the above traits is not immune to criticism or objections. Hence we do not have a 
universally accepted, equally authoritative working definition of the nation as far as various 




For example, according to Otto Bauer, “the question of the nation can only be approached 
from the concept of national character.”
21
 When it comes to national character, he 
provisionally defines it “as the complex of physical and mental characteristics that 
distinguishes one nation from others.”
22
 Bauer’s provisional definition about a nation is one 
case among many others.  
As one can see from Bauer’s definition, the current meaning of nation has the potential to be 
extended retrospectively to the pre-modern era, irrespectively of the fact that there had been 
no single society that had designated/referred to itself as nation in the modern sense of the 
word. The issue therefore is not whether there had been societies in the past that had used the 
word nation to designate themselves or not. The real issue has to be, do we have any given 
society in the past or in the present that can be understood or represented by the concept of a 
nation?  
To put it differently, any given socio-historical reality, be it English or Oromo, has/had they 
been at any given stage of their history a kind of collective entity that can be understood as a 
nation? With such goal in mind, the main focus of the present thesis is thus to test whether 
the modernist epistemology concerning the nation is applicable to the Oromo society during 
the 16
th
 century. To this end, we pursue our endeavor by trying to understand how nation is 
conceptualized by Ersnet Gellner who is the most renowned and leading modernist thinker in 
the field of nation and nationalism.   
Before presenting the provisional definition of a nation that has been put forward by Gellner, 
let us begin our discussion of Gellner’s views at a point he tend to be very skeptical about.      
Gellner says, “it is…debatable whether the normative idea of the nation, in its modern sense, 
did not presuppose the prior existence of the state.”
23
 Then he raises the following question, 
“What then is this contingent, but in our age seemingly universal and normative, idea of the 
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 After indicating his concerns, Gellner turns directly into the task of defining the 
concept. According to him, nation can be understood in the following manner: 
(1.) Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, where culture 
in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and 
communicating. (2.) Two men are of the same nation if and only if they recognize each other 
as belonging to the same nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artefacts 
of men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities. A mere category of persons (say, 
occupants of a given territory, or speakers of a given language, for example) becomes a 
nation if and when the members of the category firmly recognize certain mutual rights and 
duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership of it.
25
 
In a nutshell, Gellner’s provisional definitions revolve around two basic issues. One, culture 
is seen as a bond that facilitates solidarity and communication among the members of a 
nation, and second, the union that results in such bondage is contingent upon reciprocal 
recognition of fellow members among each other.
26
 Keeping such definitional framework in 
his mind, Gellner insists:  
If we invoke the sleeping-beauty nations, neither possessing a state nor feeling the lack of it, 
against the nationalist doctrine, we tacitly accept its social metaphysic, which sees nations as 
the bricks of which mankind is made up. Critics of nationalism, who denounce the political 
movement but tacitly accept the existence of nations, do not go far enough. The great, but 
valid, paradox is this: nations can be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, rather 
than, as you might expect, the other way round…It is nationalism which engenders nations, 
and not the other way round.
27
    








Seeing culture as a medium of communication and a community of nation that results in such 
communication through the reciprocal recognition of members brings Gellner’s assumption in parallel with the views 
of Karl W. Deutsch. Deutsch proposes a functional definition that understands nationality as the result of efficiencies 
and complementarities of social communication. Social communication “consists in the ability to communicate more 
effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group than with outsiders.” See Karl W. 
Deutsch, “Nationalism and Social Communication,” in Nationalism: Oxford Readers, ed. John Hutchinson and 
Anthony D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 26-27. 
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As it can be seen from this quote, Gellner wants to show that any effort to trace the presence 
of a nation before the modern era would be rather futile since nation is the product of 
nationalism, which itself is highly embedded in the modern period. One may ask here, why 
does it sound invalid to claim that nation existed before the modern era? Is this so only 
because nationalism created nations during the age of nationalism, that is, the 19
th
 century?  
If we rely merely on the above quoted argument, it would indeed seem that the issue of 
nationalism is the sole reason that discourages any attempt to look for nations before the 
modern era. Yet, nationalism is not the main factor, contrary to the fact that it might seem so 
when Gellner insists that nation is the legacy of the modern era. According to him, the basic 
reason is rather to be found in the socio-cultural, economic and political reality during the 
pre-modern period. In Gellner’s view, the objective conditions of the pre-modern world had 
not been favorable for nations to exist if a nation is understood as some kind of collective 
entity that unites culture and state.
28
    
Gellner, therefore, comes up with a model of his own in which he has systematically 
examined whether it was possible for a nation to exist during the pre-modern era or not. He 
divides the entire history of mankind into three stages, namely the pre-agrarian, the agrarian, 
and the industrial.
29
 During the pre-agrarian stage, socio-economic organizations were in 
such a rudimentary hunting-gathering stage that the state as “a stable specialized order-
enforcing institution, does not really arise.”
30
  
Though both the nature and the relative strength of states may vary, Gellner insists most 
agrarian societies had a state. When such societies are nevertheless examined in cross-
section, they consist of various strata that are further stratified vertically and horizontally. 
The elite in such polity, named as “agro-literate polity,” was horizontally stratified along 
lines of occupations while the polity was also vertically stratified, with “laterally insulated 
communities of agricultural producers” at the bottom.
31
 In Gellner’s view, “perhaps the 
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central, most important fact about agro-literate society is this: almost everything in it militates 
against the definition of political units in terms of cultural boundaries.”
32
  
Since such stratification and diversification within the agro-literate society was, according to 
Gellner, not only attractive but ensured the extractive and exploitative nature of both the state 
and the privileged classes, he goes on to claim that “for both the ruling stratum as a whole, 
and for the various sub-strata within it, there is great stress on cultural differentiation rather 
than on homogeneity.”
33
 Owing to the prevailing objective conditions, thus “no one has an 
interest in promoting cultural homogeneity [among the peasantry].”
34
 “Such [agro-literate] 
societies,” argues Gellner further, “simply do not possess the means for making literacy near 
universal and incorporating the broad masses of the population in a high culture…”
35
   
The presence of high-culture that acted as a cliff separating the elite from the illiterate 
agrarian mass on the one hand, and numerous other horizontal cultural cleavages both within 
the upper and the lower strata on the other hand, makes it difficult, according to Gellner, to 
talk about shared culture in the pre-modern society. He thus insists that “any definition of 
nations in terms of shared culture is another net which brings in far too rich a catch…The 
agrarian world simply could not be so neat.”
36
  
In contrast, industrial societies, argues Gellner, possess the objective conditions that can 
sustain the formation and existence of a nation. Based on this claim, Gellner concludes: 
The establishment of pervasive high cultures (standardized, literacy- and education-based 
systems of communication), a process rapidly gathering pace throughout the world, has made 
it seem, to anyone too deeply immersed in our contemporary assumptions, that nationality 
may be definable in terms of shared culture…The great, but valid, paradox is this: nations can 
be defined only in terms of the age of nationalism, rather than, as you might expect, the other 
way round. It is not the case that the ‘age of nationalism’ is a mere summation of the 
awakening and political self-assertion of this, that, or the other nation. Rather, when general 



















social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, 
pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which well-
defined educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind of 
unit…
37
   
Based on this, one can see that the agro-literate society in Gellner’s theory is presented as one 
polarity within a dichotomy in which industrial societies stand on the other end. Structured in 
this way, the validity of Gellner’s model depends on the trueness or falseness of two 
hypotheses, in as much as the validity of one presupposes the invalidity of the other.  
Leaving details aside, the two hypotheses can be formulated in the following way: First, the 
objective reality that characterizes pre-modern societies encourages the formation of nations 
or provides possibility for a nation to exist. The second hypothesis posits that nation is a mere 
logical legacy of the industrial society. Consequently, the validity of the second hypothesis 
necessarily depends on the first hypothesis to remain invalid.   
Having framed Gellner’s model in such a way, it seems appropriate at this point to raise one 
basic question. To what extent is Gellner’s agro-literate model equally and universally 
applicable across time and space? To what extent is his model, which is in itself a 
simplification of empirical reality, representative of socio-historical specificities around the 
world? To put it otherwise, how far is Gellner’s agro-literate society consistent with the nitty-
gritty of word history that remains a “great dark book,” as far as the pre-modern period in 
general and pre-colonial Africa in particular are considered?
38
  
As one may recall from the previous empirically focused discussion presented in chapter 3, 
Gellner’s agro-literate model cannot adequately explain the Oromo historical specificity 
during the 16
th
 century. On the one hand, we find the Oromo in the period entirely an agrarian 
polity without a written culture. One the other hand, we can see that the Oromo society was 
“egalitarian” in the sense that there was almost no inequality from a political-economic 





These questions are raised in relation to the issue of validity concerning Gellner’s model. Borrowing some 
lines from John Breuilly, it may be argued also that “one should be clear about what justifies ‘theory’ in relation to the 
subject of nationalism. First, theory has itself to be subject to some kinds of tests against evidence. So it is crucial that 
theory be framed in such a way as to allow of such tests.” Cf. John Breuilly, “Approaches to nationalism,” in 
Nationalism: Critical Concepts in Political Science, ed. John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, vol.1 (London: 
Routledge, 2000), 324.  




perspective. While the political space was only open to any competent and willing men, the 
‘public sphere’ was open to anyone.   
The Oromo polity spoke one language and shared the same belief system. Every member 
participated in the public life via different roles and duties assigned to him/her. Member’s 
participation had been moderated by a mix of agency and various structural frameworks. 
Using their socialization and assimilative mechanisms such as the mogaasaa institution as a 
point of reference, one may also suggest the presence of collective consciousness in the sense 
of the Oromo “self” vis-à-vis the “other”.  
Finally, it has been shown how the interplay between power and culture in the Oromo case 
form an almost total harmony. Whatever kind of analytic framework one may apply; it is 
hardly possible to think of the Oromo during the period in question as a stratified society. The 
Oromo did not have an independent and well differentiated elite group with its peculiar high 
culture that could be contrasted to the ‘folk’ culture of the masses. Analytical distinctions 
such as elite versus masses, high culture versus ‘folk’ culture, privileged versus unprivileged 
subgroups fails to be fruitful when one attempts to use them for the purpose of understanding 




Using the above comparative analogy between Gellner’s ‘agro-literate’ society and the 
Oromo during the 16th century, one may get a glimpse as to how the socio-historical 
specificities at the backdrop of Gellner’s model are mainly applicable to a European 
historicity only. One may notice that such definition of the nation hardly takes into 
consideration other specificities, such as the case of the Oromo.  
It would be, nevertheless, too premature to draw any conclusions at this point. It is wise to get 
insights from another prominent modernist scholar in order to understand where Oromo could 
be placed in the modernist understanding of a nation. This time, we turn to John Breuilly, 
who is another key modernist thinker. We are interested in him only because as a historian, 
Breuilly makes use of history to refute the validity of the perennialists’ view of nation.  
By reading Breuilly’s refutation of the perennialists view of nation, one may gain at least 




instrumental in the understanding of a nation; secondly, it shows what kind of historical 
ammunitions modernists have been using to refute any claim that traces the existence of 
nations to the pre-modern era; and finally, it helps to answer the question whether those 
historical evidences, which have been used by modernists to substantiate their arguments vis-
à-vis the perennialists are drawn from ‘world history’ or from European cases only.      
Using the question “When is the Nation?” as the core topic, the center for the Study of 
Ethnicity and Nationalism (ASEN) at the London School of Economics and Political Science 
moderated a debate among some distinguished speakers associated with the three schools of 
thoughts. The modernist school was represented, among others, by John Breuilly.  
To the inquiry, “How old is an old nation?” Breuilly swiftly states his position by declaring 
that “I take a modernist position on nation and nationalism. I dispute the primordialist and 
perennialist claims that there are pre-modern nations and even nationalisms.”
39
 Turning to the 
arguments of the perennialist by Anthony Smith, as it is summarized in his meta-theoretical 
work, Nationalism and Modernism, Breuilly expresses his doubts concerning the validity of 
perennialists’ arguments.  
According to him, the arguments made by the perennial school tend to assume “the form of 
general assertion accompanied by brief examples.” He then examines and consequently 
refutes the possibility of England as a prototype of a nation as suggested by  Adrian Hasting 
and others. “If the perennialist argument can be refuted for this strong case,” Breuilly argues, 
“a fortiori the refutation may be assumed to work for weaker cases.”
40
    
In order to establish a common framework, he has borrowed two definitions of the nation 
from two different works by Anthony Smith. The first one defines nation as “a named human 
population occupying an historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public 
culture, and common laws and customs for all members.”
41
 The second definition that 
Breuilly has borrowed is a modified version of the previous definition by Smith.  
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Among other things added and modified in the second definition, two terms capture 
Breuilly’s attention. According to him, “all members” from the first definition is omitted and 
is replaced by “self-defined” in the modified version of the second definition by Smith. 
Though I am not fully convinced with the differential implication of the two terms as it 
sounds so for Breuilly, the point that Breuilly wants to establish here by using these two 
terms as a point of references is worthy of note.  
Breuilly’s concern seems to emanate from the implication that would result from the 
replacement of “all members” by “self-defined.” Such reformulation of the definition of 
nation, Breuilly remarks, would confine nation as representation of the elites and by-
extension excluded the mass from being considered as part of a nation. If nation were to be 
considered as an exclusive domain of the elites, then it would have been difficult for Breuilly 
to refute the presence of a nation before the modern period.
42
  
Having explicitly noted his concern and methodological stance, Breuilly goes on to examine 
the possibility of England being the oldest nation. Tracing the origin of Englishness back as 
far as AD 731, Breuilly suggests that “‘English’ is subordinate to a primary Roman Christian 
and secondary Northumbrian dynastic value.”
43
 He insists that before the late Anglo-Saxon 
period, England was divided among various competing political entities, some of whom used 
the name “English” to describe themselves.
44
  
Following 1066, successive Norman rulers established a Norman rule for some centuries 
without abandoning the name “English”.
45
 Breuilly then argues that “the terms ‘England’ and 
‘English’ served to describe this government, its ruling elite and even occasionally to appeal 
to the subjects of this rule. The term ‘English’ continued but changed its meaning, and began 
to be accompanied by the term ‘England’ to describe the territory of the English.”
46
  



















The central point that Breuilly finds important to make is that “continuity in governmental 
institutions does not automatically mean continuity in names and cultural identity.” “The 
Normans,” he argues, “were a conquest elite; perhaps 8, 000 people imposed their rule on a 
population of 1.5 million.” The other important point that he wants to show is the fact that the 
ethnic component as a means of mobilizing the masses did not happen in England.  
In his criticism against the use of the ‘Hundred Years War’ as justification for the 
mobilization of the ethnic mass, Breuilly argues that the notion of the ‘defence of the realm’ 
was only “an appeal to the ‘English nation’ defined as the subjects of the English crown. 
There is arguably an ethnic component in the descent myths but these confined to elites. 
There is no ethnic component to the appeal to the common interest.”
47
      
After looking through the reformation period in order to strengthen his argument, Breuilly 
concluded his refutation of the perennialist ideas in the following way: 
I concluded that nation, or rather national identity in the sense of certain processes for 
constructing national identity, existed only at the elite level, in discontinuous and fragmented 
forms, in two different worlds of meaning (ethnographic and the political) which were 
connected only causally to each other, subordinate to Christian and dynastic principles, 
arguments and images, often marginalized when in conflict with Christian and dynastic 
concerns, and having little in the way of a ‘public culture’ which could maintain, reinterpret 
and transmit national identity…regnal identity was important in elite politics because England 
had developed strong, centralized state institutions. However, one cannot jump from that 
achievement to any assumption about a strong and significant sense of national identity at 
popular level and certainly not to any kind of nationalism.
48
  
As it can be seen from the historical cases Breuilly has used to justify his position, the point 
he finds important to emphasize is that national identity has to be understood as a mass 
phenomenon.  As it will be shown later, defining national identity as a mass phenomenon is 
the one point that enjoys a relative consensus among scholars in the field of nation and 
nationalism study. This is why Breuilly makes this point central to his argument, for defining 
national identity as a mass phenomenon offers him a common framework with other schools 
of thought in the field.   










If by using European history he could disprove the presence of national identity as a mass 
phenomenon during the pre-modern era, this would make it a daunting task for perennialists 
to maintain their position. After all, any argument concerning the issue under discussion 
could only be valid if they can be verified by using history as a reference. Having such a 
methodological weak link in the perennialists argument would—unless the current ‘usage of 
a nation’ is not significantly altered—make it likely that the modernists’ view maintains its 
epistemological dominance vis-à-vis the perennialist view of the nation. 
Walker Conor, for example, who presented his work under the title “The dawning of nations” 
with the purpose of refuting Breuilly’s work, disagrees with Breuilly concerning the dating of 
nations. He holds also reservations against Breuilly’s and by-extension Smith’s working 
definition of a nation. Yet, he concurs with Breuilly on some points. Conor admits that 
“‘national consciousness is a mass, not an elite phenomenon, and the masses, until quite 




Here it must be noted that Conor’s emphasis on the illiteracy of the masses is not meant to 
define literacy as some kind of a priori for a nation to exist. Rather, the importance of 
literacy needs to be understood in terms of its facilitating capacity to harmonize mass culture 
with elite culture. Ultimately he nevertheless agrees with Breuilly’s position “that one cannot 
safely ascribe national consciousness to a people without evidence that it was not restricted to 
an elite, that it is necessary to establish that it was shared by other segments of the putative 
nation.”
50
     
As far as ethno-symbolism is considered, one may argue that it has a strong methodological 
foundation vis-à-vis the other schools for two basic reasons. First, as an emergent system of 
thought in the field of nation and nationalism, ethno-symbolism has been developed as a third 
alternative in the field by capitalizing on the fore-tradition it has inherited from modernists 
and perennialists.  
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Second, owing to the fact that ethnie and ethnicity has a lot to share with nation and 
nationalism, bringing the former two concepts at the center of analysis in the process of 
understanding nation and nationalism has endowed ethno-symbolism with a methodological 
leverage. Smith for instance, argues that “neither modernists nor perennialists had much to 
say about ethnicity and its role in the formation of nations.”
51
         
In one of his collected works, Smith claims that “…while national identity is mainly a 
modern phenomenon, pre-modern ethnic communities and identities are widespread and 
processes of national formation and representation are found in all epochs.”
52
 If we read 
carefully between the lines, we can clearly see some gray areas in the previous passage taken 
from Smith.  
On the one hand, Smith seems to accept the modernist view about a nation. He says that 
“national identity is mainly a modern phenomenon,” which, by-implication would also, mean 
that nation itself is primarily a modern phenomenon. We may ask here, why did Smith insert 
the adverb ‘mainly,’ when he could have simply said that ‘national identity is a modern 
phenomenon?’It seems plausible that Smith might not been convinced that national identity 
and nationhood are from a historical point of view necessarily specific to the modern period. 
It occurs to me that Smith had hardly any other option than positing his reservation against 
the modernist orthodoxy that views nation as a byproduct of the modern period.  
Because, any intent to go beyond such skeptic position and prove the presence of nations 
during the pre-modern period would have been tantamount reckoning with the modernists’ 
firepower that is endowed with a rich body of historical evidences as far as European history 
is considered. It seems plausible, therefore, that ethno-symbolists, like perennialists, might 
have been bothered by the thorny issue of national consciousness. Without being able to 
prove the presence of ‘national consciousness’ or national identity in the past, it remains a 
daunting task to disprove the modernist position that confines the advent of a nation to the 
modern era.      
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As it has been discussed at length at our reading of both Gellner and Breuilly, the 
ethnographic boundary had hardly been congruent with the boundary of the state, which by 
itself was a heterogeneous whole during Europe’s pre-modern era. As long as the 
understanding of ‘national consciousness’ or national identity is contingent on the inclusion 
of the masses, it remains a difficult task to justify the presence of these two phenomena 
before the pre-modern period in Europe.  
Using the views from Gellner and Breuilly, European states may be depicted as loose entities 
consisting of discrete parts owing to the fact that their respective societies were highly 
divided along horizontal and vertical lines, a fact that discouraged the identification of the 
masses with the hegemonic elite within the framework of a collective identity.  
Facing the formidable arsenal of the modernists’ historical argumentations, Smith attempts to 
bypass the methodological impasse and reach the pre-modern era for the study of nation and 
nationalism through other methodological routes. Smith and his fellow ethno-symbolic 
thinkers have devised numerous strategies. The first breakthrough would be to dismantle the 
modernist dogma that demands nationalism to be seen as an a priori of nation.  
Ever since John A. Armstrong’s seminal work, ‘Nations before nationalism,’ ethno-
symbolists have persuasively argued that nations can occur before nationalism.
53
 Such stance 
has enabled ethno-symbolism to trace the process concerning the formation of national 
identity deep into the pre-modern period without the methodological necessity to reckon with 
the modernist view that considers nationalism as historically specific to the modern period.         
In order to revitalize the pre-modern world as a resource for the understanding of nation and 
nationalism, Smith and his fellow ethno-symbolist thinkers have borrowed an important 
historical time from the French Annales school, that is, Fernand Braudel’s ‘la longue 
durée.’
54
 The adoption of Braudel’s  longue durée in the study of nation and nationalism has 
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been one of the strengths of ethno-symbolism. Because longue durée provides a framework 
for involving the pre-modern era in a historical analysis that can trace the formation of a 
nation deep into the past.  
Keeping this in mind, if we return our attention to the other part of the same quotation by 
Smith, namely that “pre-modern ethnic communities and identities are widespread and 
processes of national formation and representation are found in all epochs,” one may see 
which route Smith has followed to bypass the modernist view concerning the nation as an 
inherently modern phenomenon.   
Why does ethno-symbolism commit itself to the diachronic analysis of the formation of a 
nation? Since the need to analyze the ethnic core and the symbolic aspects of ethnicity as a 
means to understand nation and nationalism is the basic methodological stance that enables 
ethno-symbolism to remain as the third alternative vis-à-vis the modernists’ and perennialists’ 
views of a nation, historical inquiry into the pre-modern period proves to be indispensable, 
rather than just a choice to be taken by ethno-symbolism.  
Ethno-symbolism views ethnic communities as ubiquitous phenomena during the pre-modern 
era.
55
 On the basis of such presumptions, modern nations are thus seen as the outcome of the 
persistence of collective identity embedded in the solidarity of members of the ethnic 
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community that forms the core of the nation. If modern nations are highly embedded in their 
ethnic past, then it seems wise methodologically to look into the ethnic pasts of modern 
nations for understanding the process of nation formation. To this end, ethno-symbolism 
attempts to analyze the process of ethno-genesis during the pre-modern era in order to 
understand the context in which a particular modern nation came into being. 
In my opinion, the adoption of Braudel’s longue durée as a basic framework of inquiry to 
explore the link between various kinds of processes of ethno-genesis during the pre-modern 
period and the process of nation formation is by far the greatest leap forward in the study of 
nations and nationalism. As it has been shown throughout the current chapter, the other two 
schools highly depend on historical resources in order to justify their respective 
methodological positions and invalidate each other’s positions.  
It is self-evident that historical interpretations play a paramount role in the understanding of 
nation and nationalism for any theoretical abstraction of the nation has to gain its validity 
from social and historical specificities. Yet, if a nation is seen as a phenomenon that 
transcends the European particularity, then to what extent is ‘world history’ used as a source 
to justify or invalidate the various theses in the study of nation and nationalism?  
Using la longue durée as diachronic plane to dig into the temporal depth of Europe as far as 
possible seems a fruitful task to properly understand nations in light of their ethnic past.
56
 
Yet, to what extent are non-European societies such as the Oromo polity during the 16
th
 
century, who had been in the darker corner of the records of world history, are taken into 
consideration when such justifications or refutations of counter-theories are made? 
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The main preoccupation of the entire discussion throughout the whole thesis has been geared 
towards achieving one basic goal. The goal has been to test the validity of the universal 
axiom of the modernist tradition that implant the origin of a nation in a European specificity. 
To counter such modernist’s dogmatism, the thesis has attempted to understand a nation from 
pre-modern period outside European specificity, by taking the Oromo polity during the 16
th
 
century as a case.  
Provided that the modernists’ view of a nation is an established and dominant tradition in the 
field of nation and nationalism, any research endeavor that intends to challenge such 
epistemological tradition in relation to a nation could be considered as an ambitious project. 
When the present thesis attempts to challenge the modernists’ epistemological tradition 
concerning a nation by drawing on historical specificity in Africa that have been depicted as 
an abode of tribal societies, the current endeavor would rather give the impression that the 
current thesis is a mere over ambitious project that can hardly be realized.       
It has been a requisite for the present thesis to look for an epistemological tradition that can 
render for the methodological presumptions of the thesis a kind of shelter to avoid the current 
thesis’ endeavor from being considered as a mere over ambitious project. Grounding the 
methodological presumptions of the entire thesis on Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics 
has not been a choice to make, but it has rather been a methodological prerequisite for the 
present thesis. In light of the points that have been just discussed, therefore, one can see the 
paramount significance of the task that was accomplished by chapter two which has served as 
the corner stone for the overall thesis. The following two arguments justify why chapter two 
is given such importance. 
Firstly, throughout the entire thesis, the basic preoccupation has been to understand the 
phenomenon of a nation from the vantage point of historical specificity drawn from Oromo’s 
mode of existence during the 16
th
 century. Since nation as a concept is basically the result of 
European discursive unit, to use the Oromo historical specificity during the 16
th
 century as a 
vantage point ultimately results in a contradiction between European oriented tradition and 
the one that is generated from an African context. Understanding a nation has, therefore, 




To understand a nation in this manner ultimately results in contradiction that can be 
understood as a hermeneutic encounter of experience. Such hermeneutics encounters have to 
be properly channeled in order to understand nation by synthesizing new meanings from the 
existing contradictions. From this mind set up, therefore, it can be reasserted that the thesis 
has gained a lot for it has been undertaken in a manner of hermeneutic practices.        
Secondly, when the thesis has tried to address the problem of validity in opposition to some 
dogmatic positions of modernists, the thesis has been laid on two basic epistemological 
grounds that it has borrowed from existing hermeneutic traditions. One, the horizon of human 
experience is finite, but dynamic. Two, world history has to be the supreme authority of any 
theories that claim universality in the fields of social sciences and humanities.  
By using these two epistemological positions from hermeneutics traditions, therefore, the 
other three chapters of the thesis have been harmonized in a kind of parts and whole 
relationship. By using these two pillars as an organizing nodes, chapter two has rendered for 
the thesis to have a kind of dialectal interplay among its various parts/chapters/ and between 
the parts and the thesis as a whole. To justify our assertion that upholds the overall thesis is 
organized in dialectical interplay, this section will briefly summarize each chapter in few 
paragraphs so that the discussions will develop the overall conclusion.  
As it has been attempted to highlight in chapter one, the finitude aspect of human experience 
has been illustrated taking the Oromo as a case. The Oromo has been marginalized from 
Ethiopian historiography which in return partly explains why the Oromo have been in the 
darker corner of world historiography. If the Oromo has hardly been represented in various 
records of world history, then it is evident that the history of the Oromo has been almost 
inaccessible. It follows then; it is not a surprise to observe that Oromo’s historical 
specificities have been overlooked when theoretical conclusions that have universal appeals 
have been made in relation to the phenomenon of nation.  
Equally important also, it has been attempted to show in the same chapter that theories of 
nation and nationalism still lack a single, universal, and overarching theory to date. Among 
other things, this has been the case mainly because human knowledge is inherently dynamic 
that the knowledge base of nation and nationalism is enormously expanding in parallel with 




complexities of the social universe. These complexities are multi-layered, cross-cutting and 
subject to historical trajectories that infusing these complexities into the existing theories of 
nation and nationalism has made the field of study to be the center of recurrent and fierce 
debates; and concepts of nation and nationalism to remain as ambiguous and as controversial 
as they have ever been.     
By using modernists’ view of a nation as a bench mark, nation has been understood as a 
universal phenomenon in the field of nation and nationalism. As universal phenomenon, the 
origin of a nation is embedded in the modern period which in turn is the outcome of 
combination of European specificities that include the French and Industrial Revolutions. 
Provided that world history has always been ‘a great dark book,’ it has been attempted to 
show that historical knowledge about the pre-modern world and particularly in areas outside 
Europe is insufficient and incomplete, therefore, it is precarious to conclusively conclude that 
nation during the pre-modern period did not exist at all.  
Through chapter three, one important theme has come into surface: The Oromo during the 
16
th
 century had a socio-cultural and political entity that is in close semblance with the 
empirical implication of different features that a nation is believed to constitute. Since the 
Oromo has been at the darker corner of world history, it has been hardly possible for 
distinguished scholars in the field of nation and nationalism to give due attention for such 
African specificity while making different formulations about a nation at different occasions.  
The basic purpose of chapter three has been to challenge the modernists’ dogmatism 
concerning a nation. When the thesis attempts to understand a nation from the vantage point 
of Oromo society by using its mode of existence during the 16
th
 century as a reference point, 
the thesis has ultimately revealed its methodological conviction in opposition to the temporal 
and spatial impositions of modernists’ dogmatism in relation to the origin of a nation.  
At this particular level of our discussion, therefore, we can suggest the following two points: 
For one thing, the modernists’ dogmatism in relation to the origin of a nation is insufficient; 
for the other thing, in the presence of such empirical loopholes like the case with the Oromo, 




It is evident that the suggestion that has been established in the last lines of the previous 
paragraph is a mere skeptic position that it does not strictly conclude whether the modernists’ 
views concerning the origin of a nation are valid or not. As what has been attempted to 
accomplish in chapter four, there has been a need to understand the historical and social 
conditions which serve as an empirical context and framework from which nation is 
understood by scholars of nation and nationalism.   
As it has been shown in chapter four, the pre-modern period has been basically understood 
from the vantage point of Europe. By using mainly European socio-historical contexts, it has 
been argued that the objective preconditions during the pre-modern world were not in a 
position to sustain the existence or formation of nationhood.  
As it has been attempted to show implicitly in comparison to chapter three, and explicitly by 
using some comparative analogy between Gellner’s ‘agro-literate’ polity and the Oromo 
polity during the 16
th
 century in chapter four; the objective preconditions that prevailed 
during the pre-modern period in European context are entirely different from the one that is 
the case with the Oromo context in the span of the same period.  
Provided that the two historical specificities are highly different to each other, any 
generalization that can be made by using either of these two specificities is hardly applicable 
to the other historical specificity. It occurs evident at this level that chapter three and chapter 
four are interdependent to each other. Chapter three has been integrated with such 
methodological presumptions of chapter two by highlighting the fact that world history has 
always been a great dark book.  
On the other hand, chapter four has been harmonized relying on the same methodological 
presumption that states human horizon of experience is inherently finite. Thus the existing 
theories concerning a nation have been highly influenced by the finitude aspect of human 
horizon of experience. Chapter one, serving as an introductory platform, has highlighted two 
things: Existing historical knowledge concerning human history is by far incomplete; and 
consequently, theories of nation and nationalism have always been highly dynamic.  
From this perspective, therefore, it is self-evident that the whole thesis and its various 




of such claims of dialectical interplay among the thesis and its various chapters, the thesis 
proceeds to make some concluding remarks. It occurs at this level self-evident that the 
conclusion of the present thesis state that the modernists’ view that embeds the origin of a 
nation in the modern period is invalid at least when seen from the vantage point of the Oromo 
historical context during the 16
th
 century.  
One important question has to be raised here: Did the Oromo represent a nation during the 
16
th
 century? In the present situation, it is hardly possible to conclusively conclude that the 
Oromo were indeed a nation during the 16
th
 century. For one thing, to consider the Oromo as 
nation requires the existing knowledge base concerning a nation to be revised so that the 
existing temporal and spatial imposition upon the origin of a nation needs to be either 
reconfigured or abandoned. As long the conventional knowledge base concerning a nation is 
not revisited to accommodate the changes that we have proposed, it is hardly possible to 
regard the Oromo during the 16
th
 century as a representation of nationhood.  
The present thesis hopes it has further exposed the internal contradiction that is inherent in 
the concept of a nation by using fresh empirical evidences. Therefore, the thesis can add up to 
the existing contradiction as catalyst so that the outcome of the present endeavor will 
hopefully provoke or encourage scholars in the field to make further rethinking and 
consequently reformulation of the concept of a nation from a new foundation, the pre-modern 
period. The Oromo case will hopefully enrich the empirical knowledge base of scholars in the 
field to the effect that the Oromo can be seriously considered in the future undertakings when 
there will be an attempt to reformulate the concept of a nation.   
Therefore, the present thesis can only suggest the following two points: One, it is very 
demanding to revisit the concept of a nation in way world history can be recurrently tapped as 
much as possible every time some historical realities come into light from otherwise darker 
and marginal positions like the Oromo has used to be. Such fresh empirical reality ultimately 
broaden the horizon of experience that the infusion of fresh interpretations will help to 
resolve through time the internal contradiction that is inherent in the concept of nation.  
On the contrary, if the internal contradiction will persist and nation will always continue as 
controversial as what it is now, then one of the following skeptical remarks would rather 




already indicated in chapter one, one may conclude that no single, universal theory of a 
nation is hardly possible. Like any other historical singularities, probably nation is also a 
singular social reality in which European nation is different from African nation; 
consequently, there is no universal principle that is free from any international contradiction 
to be equally applicable to both contexts. In the extreme case, it seems also likely that nation 
might have been a mere intellectual construct. If the latter extreme case is true, then there will 
hardly be any empirical reality from which nation can derive its validity. 
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